The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour (PBS) - 1993-04-13

Channel: malgent

Transcript

Language: English (original, YouTube automatic captions)

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[0:12] NewsHour is provided by AT&T.

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[0:27] And by the Corporation for Public

[0:28] Broadcasting.

[0:30] And viewers like you.

[0:32] A United Nations aid convoy today

[0:34] evacuated 800 Muslim refugees from the

[0:37] Bosnian town of Srebrenica. Among them

[0:39] were dozens wounded when Serb shells

[0:42] pounded the town yesterday killing at

[0:43] least 56 people including 15 children.

[0:47] The refugee convoy arrived this evening

[0:49] in the Muslim stronghold of Tuzla. The

[0:51] trucks were covered with tarpaulins to

[0:53] protect the Muslims from Serb youths. UN

[0:55] officials say they have stoned previous

[0:57] refugee convoys.

[0:59] The head of UN refugee operations in

[1:01] Bosnia bitterly denounced the Bosnian

[1:03] Serb army for forcing the Muslims of

[1:06] Srebrenica to choose between transported

[1:08] like cattle or slaughtered like sheep.

[1:11] We'll have more on the Bosnian story

[1:12] later in the program. Kitty.

[1:15] In South Africa the alleged killer of

[1:17] African National Congress leader Chris

[1:19] Hani appeared in court today and was

[1:22] ordered held until May 12th. He is a

[1:24] white man with ties to right-wing

[1:26] groups. African National Congress

[1:28] supporters protested outside the

[1:30] courthouse. But ANC leader Nelson

[1:33] Mandela pleaded for calm. The government

[1:36] has ordered curfews in several districts

[1:38] where violence has flared after Hani's

[1:40] killing. We'll have more on the story

[1:42] later in the program.

[1:46] Israeli helicopter gunships and

[1:48] artillery pounded several villages in

[1:50] southern Lebanon today. The attacks

[1:52] followed a roadside bombing earlier in

[1:54] the day that killed three Israeli

[1:57] soldiers on patrol. Two others were

[1:59] wounded. The bombing was claimed by the

[2:02] radical Muslim group Hezbollah which is

[2:04] opposed to the Middle East peace talks.

[2:07] Those talks are set to resume next week

[2:09] in Washington.

[2:11] Officials in Hanoi have said a newly

[2:13] discovered document about American POWs

[2:16] is a fraud and a fabrication. The

[2:18] document was found in Soviet archives in

[2:21] Moscow. It says the Vietnamese held more

[2:23] than 1200 US prisoners near the end of

[2:26] the Vietnam War. But a few months after

[2:28] it was allegedly written they released

[2:30] fewer than 600 saying they were the only

[2:32] US prisoners being held. Vietnamese

[2:35] government officials today blamed the

[2:37] memo on unnamed people who wanted to

[2:39] sabotage a renewal of US Vietnamese

[2:41] relations.

[2:43] In Washington Senator Robert Smith

[2:45] Republican of New Hampshire and a member

[2:46] of the Select Committee on POWs and MIAs

[2:50] held a news conference with members of

[2:51] MIA families. He had this to say.

[2:56] We're here to stand united today in

[2:59] strong opposition to normalization with

[3:02] Vietnam and strong opposition to

[3:04] relaxing the trade embargo or

[3:06] or removing the trade embargo and

[3:08] certainly in opposition to

[3:10] any loans from the International

[3:12] Monetary Fund or any other international

[3:14] fund to provide funds to the Vietnamese

[3:16] unless and until they provided the

[3:19] fullest possible accounting for all of

[3:21] our missing.

[3:22] A State Department spokesman said the

[3:24] document will be the first thing on the

[3:26] US agenda when talks on normalization of

[3:28] relations with Vietnam now resume there

[3:31] next week. We'll have more on the story

[3:33] right after the news summary.

[3:35] The standoff continued today at a prison

[3:37] in southern Ohio. Officials discovered

[3:40] the body of an inmate today, the seventh

[3:42] found since inmates rioted and took over

[3:45] a cell block at the Lucasville, Ohio

[3:47] prison on Sunday. Eight guards are being

[3:50] held hostage by the rebellious

[3:51] prisoners. Inmates used a loudspeaker

[3:54] today to complain about the slow pace of

[3:57] negotiations with authorities.

[3:59] In economic news the Commerce Department

[4:01] reported retail sales fell a full

[4:04] percent in March. It was the worst

[4:06] decline in more than two years. The

[4:08] department said last month's big East

[4:10] Coast blizzard was partly to blame.

[4:12] Administration officials claimed the

[4:14] report highlighted the need for

[4:15] President Clinton's $16 billion economic

[4:18] stimulus plan which remains blocked by a

[4:21] Republican filibuster in the Senate.

[4:23] Meanwhile Japan today approved an

[4:25] economic stimulus plan of its own. The

[4:28] $117 billion dollar package is aimed

[4:31] partly at reducing the country's record

[4:33] trade surplus by stimulating domestic

[4:35] consumption of imports. US displeasure

[4:38] over Japan's trade imbalance with the US

[4:41] is expected to be high on the agenda

[4:43] when President Clinton meets with

[4:44] Japan's Prime Minister later this week.

[4:47] President Clinton helped commemorate

[4:49] Thomas Jefferson's 250th birthday today.

[4:52] The ceremonies were at the Jefferson

[4:54] Memorial in Washington. It was also the

[4:56] 50th anniversary of the dedication of

[4:59] the memorial which is surrounded by the

[5:01] famous cherry blossom trees currently in

[5:04] full bloom. Mr. Clinton used the

[5:06] opportunity to campaign for his

[5:07] legislative agenda. He drew parallels

[5:10] between Jefferson's philosophy of

[5:12] government and his own policy.

[5:16] Thomas Jefferson understood

[5:18] that no politician

[5:20] no government no piece of paper

[5:23] could do for the American people what

[5:24] they would have to do for themselves. He

[5:27] understood

[5:28] better perhaps than any of his

[5:30] colleagues that the people of this

[5:32] country would always have to be not only

[5:34] the protectors of their own liberty

[5:36] but the agents of their own

[5:37] transformation and change.

[5:39] But he also knew that government must be

[5:41] willing to supply the tools of that

[5:44] change.

[5:46] And that very simply is our task today.

[5:50] In Charlottesville, Virginia today

[5:52] former Soviet President Mikhail

[5:54] Gorbachev attended ceremonies

[5:56] commemorating Jefferson's birthday at

[5:58] the University of Virginia which

[6:00] Jefferson founded. Gorbachev said

[6:02] Jefferson often inspired him as he tried

[6:05] to bring democratic changes to the

[6:06] Soviet Union.

[6:08] The Pulitzer Prizes were awarded today.

[6:10] The Washington Post won three including

[6:13] one for a pre-election examination of

[6:15] candidate Bill Clinton's record. The

[6:17] Miami Herald won the public service gold

[6:19] medal for its coverage of Hurricane

[6:21] Andrew. The Pulitzer Prize for fiction

[6:24] went to Robert Olen Butler for the novel

[6:26] A Good Scent from a Strange Mountain.

[6:28] David McCullough won the biography award

[6:30] for his book Truman and Garry Wills won

[6:33] the general non-fiction prize for his

[6:35] study of Lincoln's Gettysburg Address.

[6:38] That's it for our summary of the day's

[6:39] top stories. Just ahead on the NewsHour,

[6:42] did Vietnam hide the number of American

[6:44] prisoners of war? What's next for

[6:46] Yugoslavia? We hear from Henry Kissinger

[6:49] and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Then a report

[6:52] from South Africa on the impact of the

[6:54] weekend assassination of an ANC leader

[6:57] and an Amy Wallace essay.

[7:08] We begin tonight with the latest twist

[7:10] in the often twisted tale of the fate of

[7:12] 2200 US servicemen still missing from

[7:15] the Vietnam War.

[7:16] Resolution of the missing-in-action

[7:18] issue is the major obstacle to

[7:20] establishing full diplomatic relations

[7:22] between the US and Vietnam 20 years

[7:24] after the Paris Peace Accords ended the

[7:27] American combat role in that country.

[7:29] President Clinton has just sent a

[7:31] special emissary to Hanoi for more

[7:33] answers on the MIA issue.

[7:35] But over the weekend came a report that

[7:37] Vietnam deliberately misled the US on

[7:40] the number of prisoners it was holding

[7:42] and would return at the end of

[7:43] hostilities in 1973.

[7:46] If verified that could mean several

[7:48] hundred Americans have since died in

[7:50] captivity or are still being held.

[7:52] The Vietnamese government has denounced

[7:54] the document as a fabrication.

[7:56] It was discovered by a Harvard

[7:58] researcher Stephen J. Morris who is

[8:00] working on a book about the war and

[8:01] that's where we begin our coverage.

[8:04] Dr. Morris you're joining us from

[8:06] Boston. Describe just how and where you

[8:09] found this document. I found the

[8:11] document in the archives of the former

[8:14] Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

[8:16] I had been given access as part of a

[8:19] group sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson

[8:23] Center for scholars in Washington, D.C.

[8:26] People working on different aspects of

[8:28] the Cold War.

[8:29] And I was the only one who was working

[8:31] on the history of the Vietnam War.

[8:33] And I should point out that I'm the only

[8:36] person outside the former Communist

[8:38] Party of the Soviet Union who has read

[8:40] these documents on the Vietnam War.

[8:42] And what were you actually looking for

[8:45] when you found this document? Well, I

[8:46] wasn't looking for this to be quite

[8:48] honest. I was looking for interesting

[8:49] information about Vietnamese Communist

[8:51] strategy during the war and the

[8:54] conditions inside North Vietnam from the

[8:56] point point of view of the Soviet Union

[8:58] because of course they had a very

[9:00] intense and

[9:02] commitment to North Vietnam. They had

[9:04] military advisers. They had KGB people.

[9:06] They had political cadres. And the

[9:08] embassy reports were extremely

[9:09] interesting. And it was in the course of

[9:11] reading some of these documents that I

[9:13] stumbled upon one which had the first

[9:16] revelations

[9:17] about American prisoners of war.

[9:20] Now, this is a document said to have

[9:22] been written by whom? It's been written

[9:25] by Lieutenant General Tran Van Quang who

[9:28] was then the Deputy Chief of Staff of

[9:31] the North Vietnamese Army.

[9:32] And he was giving a report to the

[9:35] Politburo of the Vietnamese Communist

[9:37] Party. In fact, this was not the first

[9:39] document I've read by him. The previous

[9:41] report that he'd written on June 12th

[9:43] which doesn't deal with the question of

[9:44] prisoners of war by the way,

[9:46] I have also read there. Uh-huh. And this

[9:48] had been passed on by the Vietnamese

[9:50] Politburo to the Russian what or Soviet

[9:53] >> No, I don't know how it got into the

[9:56] archives. But based on reading a lot of

[9:58] other documents

[10:00] a lot of other documents which were

[10:01] provided to the Central Committee by the

[10:04] uh by the Soviet military, that is to

[10:06] the Soviet Central Committee by the

[10:08] Soviet military.

[10:09] I believe that the Soviet military

[10:12] intelligence had informers uh

[10:15] within the highest levels of the

[10:16] Vietnamese Communist Party. I don't

[10:17] believe the Vietnamese Communist Party

[10:19] would necessarily have given such a

[10:21] document, but somebody gave it to the to

[10:23] the Soviet. Now, in addition to giving

[10:25] the new total of 1,205

[10:28] prisoners, roughly three times what we

[10:31] thought were there,

[10:33] it says the prisoners were grouped

[10:34] politically. Would you explain that? Uh

[10:37] yes, they were grouped according to

[10:38] their political orientation into uh what

[10:41] the Vietnamese called progressive, uh

[10:44] reactionary, and neutralist, according

[10:46] to whether they took the Vietnamese

[10:48] Communist line on the war, according to

[10:50] whether they were critical of President

[10:51] Nixon and the United States or not. And

[10:54] they were uh figures uh numbers given

[10:56] out. And for example, they said that the

[10:58] 368 of the prisoners were politically

[11:01] progressive, and these prisoners would

[11:03] be released in the first instance.

[11:04] Uh-huh. And the most reactionary, to use

[11:07] their term, were the senior officers in

[11:10] the group.

[11:10] >> Uh yes, not only the senior officers,

[11:12] but they said that all the senior

[11:14] officers were reactionary, within the

[11:16] reactionary category. In other words,

[11:18] were defending the American

[11:19] administration's position on the war.

[11:21] >> uh succumb to Vietnamese Communist

[11:22] propaganda. And from the copy reproduced

[11:25] in the New York Times today, it uh it

[11:27] states frankly that Hanoi was not

[11:29] telling the truth. I mean, is it

[11:31] correct?

[11:31] >> Yeah, they say very explicitly, "Up

[11:33] until now, we have only spoken of 368

[11:36] prisoners. This is not the correct

[11:37] number." In fact, this report uh

[11:40] is uh

[11:42] very definite in saying, "This is the

[11:43] first time that I, a representative of

[11:46] the Vietnamese People's Army, are

[11:48] telling you, members of the Politburo,

[11:50] how many prisoners we are holding."

[11:52] Of course, he says uh at the beginning

[11:55] of the document, "All the work that we

[11:57] are doing with the prisoners is under

[11:58] the direct supervision of the Politburo

[12:00] of the Communist Party Vietnam. But this

[12:02] is the first time I'm giving you the

[12:03] actual number."

[12:05] Now, in Hanoi, and their ambassador uh

[12:08] at the United Nations, Le Bang, says

[12:11] that this is a forgery, and it's a

[12:13] forgery designed to block improved

[12:15] relations.

[12:16] I assume you think it's authentic. Yeah,

[12:19] well, I'm not sure who he thinks forged

[12:20] it. Um

[12:22] uh there was uh in part of the media

[12:23] circus that's going on now uh over this

[12:26] issue, uh

[12:27] a uh commentator on CNN earlier today uh

[12:30] suggested that Boris Yeltsin uh and his

[12:33] administration forged the document,

[12:35] inserted it in the archives,

[12:37] uh and used me as a patsy to deliver it

[12:39] to the Clinton administration and the

[12:41] American public as a way of getting aid

[12:43] to Russia.

[12:44] What

[12:46] What convinces you of it of its

[12:48] authenticity? Uh

[12:51] Okay, many things convince me of of its

[12:53] authenticity. Uh for example, the

[12:55] language. Uh for example, the

[12:57] discussion. There are many other issues

[12:58] discussed in this document, by the way.

[13:00] The question of the American prisoners

[13:02] of war only comes at the end of the

[13:04] document. Uh and uh a lot of the

[13:07] discussion of um the uh approaches they

[13:10] had made, for example, to South

[13:11] Vietnamese uh politicians to try and get

[13:13] them involved in a coalition government

[13:15] uh rings very true with the discus the

[13:17] analysis. Uh the dis the discussion of a

[13:20] of a dispatch dispatch of a team of

[13:22] assassins to South Vietnam. But the most

[13:24] important thing, I think, which

[13:26] convinces me this is a genuine document,

[13:29] uh is the fact that there's an

[13:30] accompanying document

[13:32] where I would call, to use American

[13:34] bureaucratic parlance, an executive

[13:35] summary,

[13:37] which is written and signed by the head

[13:40] of Soviet military intelligence, a man,

[13:43] Mr. Ivan Shcherbakov, who was head of

[13:45] Soviet military intelligence for 25

[13:47] years.

[13:47] Now, the fact that he signed off

[13:50] on this suggests that the Soviet

[13:53] leadership believed that this was an

[13:55] authentic Vietnamese document. Mhm. And

[13:58] uh I am one who has greatest respect for

[14:00] the professional competence of uh Soviet

[14:03] military intelligence. All right. Well,

[14:05] we'll come back. I'm sorry, I said you

[14:07] were in Boston, you're not, you're in

[14:08] Washington. But um for more analysis on

[14:11] past and future US-Vietnamese relations,

[14:13] we turn to Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry

[14:16] Kissinger. Dr. Kissinger was Secretary

[14:18] of State under Presidents Nixon and

[14:20] Ford. He's now chairman of Kissinger

[14:22] Associates Incorporated, an

[14:23] international consulting firm. Dr.

[14:25] Brzezinski was National Security Advisor

[14:28] under President Carter. He's now

[14:30] counselor at the Center for Strategic

[14:32] and International Studies.

[14:34] Dr. Brzezinski, you were stated publicly

[14:36] in your quoted New York Times as

[14:37] believing the document is genuine. What

[14:40] convinces you?

[14:42] Its style,

[14:43] its content, the cover note to the

[14:46] Soviet Politburo.

[14:47] One would have to assume a really very

[14:51] complex Byzantine conspiracy

[14:54] to reach the conclusion that this is not

[14:56] an authentic Soviet document

[14:58] based on a Vietnamese document.

[15:02] I'm not prepared to argue that every

[15:04] detail in that document may be accurate.

[15:07] It was prepared, after all, under

[15:08] wartime conditions by the North

[15:10] Vietnamese, who were subjected to

[15:12] warfare and bombing. So this or that

[15:14] item, name, or figure may be wrong.

[15:17] But the style of the document, the

[15:19] numbers cited regarding Americans,

[15:21] correspond in some important respects to

[15:24] our estimates.

[15:25] And even the categorization of the

[15:27] prisoners into these different

[15:29] ideologically described groups is part

[15:33] and parcel of the technique that not

[15:35] only the Vietnamese, but the Soviets

[15:37] many years earlier had followed. Mhm.

[15:39] Dr. Kissinger, you negotiated the end of

[15:42] this war based on in part on the figures

[15:45] you were given

[15:47] and had to accept at the time by the

[15:49] Vietnamese. What do you think on the

[15:51] question of authenticity first of all of

[15:53] the document? Uh

[15:55] uh we did not negotiate the end of the

[15:57] agreement on the basis of the figures

[15:59] because they refused to give us the

[16:01] figures until the agreement was

[16:02] completed. Uh-huh. And uh that was one

[16:05] of the uh blackmails that they

[16:10] uh constantly used against us.

[16:13] Uh I have only read what it was in the

[16:15] New York Times, and I agree with Big

[16:19] that

[16:21] those parts that I know something about

[16:23] have an authentic ring. Good example,

[16:25] when they describe what their

[16:26] negotiating tactics were,

[16:29] those were the tactics they were using

[16:32] uh in negotiating with us. Also, Uh

[16:35] would you amplify on that just a little

[16:37] bit? They say in this document that

[16:40] uh

[16:40] the uh their proposals were

[16:44] first a ceasefire and the overthrow of

[16:47] President Thieu,

[16:49] after which they would use the

[16:52] uh

[16:52] prisoners to negotiate whatever other

[16:55] concerns they had.

[16:56] Now, as of the date of that document,

[16:59] those were their proposals.

[17:01] A month later, they changed it. But I

[17:03] could see that if they make if you make

[17:05] a report to the Politburo in the middle

[17:07] of September,

[17:09] and you want to summarize what the

[17:10] negotiating position is,

[17:12] this was exactly the negotiating

[17:14] position they had as of the date of that

[17:17] document.

[17:18] >> So somebody to have forged it would have

[17:20] to be very ingenious and to know the

[17:22] changes in their position 20 years ago.

[17:25] And on

[17:26] to be precise, on October 8th, about 3

[17:28] weeks after this document, they changed

[17:30] their position.

[17:32] But up to that time,

[17:34] they had insisted on exactly the

[17:37] conditions that are in that document,

[17:39] and they certainly wouldn't have told

[17:41] anybody that they were proposing to

[17:42] change it.

[17:44] Uh

[17:45] that was only that could only have been

[17:48] known to a very few people.

[17:50] And they didn't change it for another 3

[17:52] to 4 weeks. So if this is authentic, as

[17:55] you're suggesting it is, it suggests it

[17:57] may be may be that you were um you were

[18:00] just uh blatantly lied to during these

[18:04] I and every succeeding American

[18:06] administration because it was not only

[18:08] to our administration that they gave

[18:10] these figures.

[18:11] They have consistently maintained in

[18:13] every administration that they gave that

[18:16] they had held no additional prisoners,

[18:19] and that

[18:20] the

[18:22] uh

[18:23] they had given us an accurate account.

[18:25] They told it to us repeatedly.

[18:27] Uh we had a much smaller number that we

[18:29] were questioning. We were questioning

[18:30] about 80

[18:32] people where we had various reasons to

[18:33] believe that they had

[18:35] They adamantly denied this. They denied

[18:37] it to a committee of the Congress that

[18:39] visited there in 1975.

[18:41] I'm sure they denied it repeatedly to

[18:43] the administration

[18:45] in which Big was National Security uh

[18:48] advisor. It's been their permanent

[18:50] position that they have given they gave

[18:52] us an accurate account.

[18:54] Dr. Brzezinski, the New York Times

[18:56] quotes you as having a theory on what

[18:58] might have happened

[18:59] uh to the officers in question. Would

[19:02] you

[19:04] repeat it? Well, I do so with sadness

[19:07] and reluctance

[19:09] that I suspect that the Vietnamese

[19:12] had the view, as Henry indicated, that

[19:15] this would be a very prolonged conflict

[19:18] in which, at the best, the United States

[19:20] might partially disengage from South

[19:23] Vietnam,

[19:24] but would continue supporting it,

[19:26] and that further leverage on the United

[19:28] States

[19:29] would be desirable for them to have.

[19:33] That they were surprised by the extent

[19:35] of our willingness to accommodate, and

[19:38] then by the congressional unwillingness

[19:40] to support South Vietnam subsequently,

[19:43] and thus victory came sooner and more

[19:46] easily than they had expected.

[19:49] In the meantime, they had gone on record

[19:51] repeatedly as having only had the the

[19:54] number to which they admitted themselves

[19:57] to having

[19:58] and as having no more than those that

[20:00] they released.

[20:02] And they were stuck in it with a

[20:03] situation in which they no longer needed

[20:05] leverage against the United States and

[20:07] yet had several hundred surviving

[20:10] Americans

[20:11] many of whom they had classified as a

[20:13] reactionaries and therefore as enemies.

[20:16] And I'm therefore

[20:18] knowing

[20:20] how the Vietnamese regime has behaved in

[20:22] the past, for that matter how the Soviet

[20:24] regime has behaved in the past, I'm led

[20:27] sadly to the conclusion

[20:29] that in all probability sometime after

[20:31] the conclusion of the Paris agreements

[20:33] or perhaps after the fall of South

[20:35] Vietnam in 1975

[20:37] they executed those that were still

[20:40] living

[20:41] perhaps with the exception of a small

[20:43] number

[20:44] whom they retained for continuing

[20:46] intelligence or technical purposes.

[20:49] You compared it to the

[20:51] massacre by the Soviets under Stalin of

[20:54] the Soviet the Polish officer corps in

[20:56] the Katyn Wood. In other words, it's

[20:58] it's just a straight deliberate

[20:59] execution. Yes, because they were

[21:02] in effect in a situation of their own

[21:05] making. They had thought they would use

[21:07] these people as leverage on us and it's

[21:09] hinted in that report, the document

[21:11] which is now public.

[21:13] And they were then faced with a

[21:14] situation in which they no longer needed

[21:16] to exercise that leverage.

[21:18] And they had been publicly committed to

[21:20] the proposition that they had no more

[21:22] Americans

[21:24] and therefore some of them might have

[21:25] felt the leadership might have felt that

[21:27] this is the easiest way out and that

[21:29] incidentally explains the how of outrage

[21:33] that are now emanating from Hanoi.

[21:36] What do you think of Zbigniew

[21:37] Brzezinski's theory?

[21:39] Uh

[21:40] I I have no way of

[21:42] of judging it.

[21:44] Uh if the document is authentic

[21:46] then they were holding 1200 or some

[21:50] 800 people more

[21:52] uh than they acknowledged 3 months

[21:55] before the war ended.

[21:57] And

[21:58] then

[21:59] uh

[22:00] they admitted a then they committed a

[22:02] violation which would without any

[22:04] question have caused us to resume the

[22:05] war

[22:07] if we had known

[22:08] that they had done this.

[22:10] And uh

[22:13] so how they disposed of the prisoners uh

[22:17] I wouldn't begin to

[22:19] to guess.

[22:20] >> But logic logic would impel one to

[22:22] believe that either they're still alive

[22:24] somewhere or they were executed or they

[22:27] died gradually from I have never

[22:29] understood why they would want to hold

[22:31] prisoners that they didn't acknowledge.

[22:33] So if they held prisoners

[22:35] uh that they didn't acknowledge then

[22:37] there is

[22:38] uh

[22:39] considerable plausibility to this

[22:41] theory.

[22:42] Uh I don't see why they would hold them

[22:43] for 20 years

[22:45] without ever saying without ever using

[22:47] them in order to extort

[22:49] uh economic aid or whatever else.

[22:52] Uh

[22:54] uh In other words, if they held them and

[22:55] they were alive, they could have found

[22:57] some use for them. Well, one would have

[22:59] thought that if

[23:01] they held them in order to blackmail us

[23:04] they

[23:05] would have at some point produced them.

[23:09] Uh whether they thought this was no

[23:10] longer necessary after

[23:13] Saigon

[23:14] collapsed

[23:16] and to I think in fairness we have to

[23:18] admit to ourselves it collapsed because

[23:19] our Congress cut off both the ability to

[23:22] use military force

[23:24] and reduced aid by 50% in each year.

[23:28] Uh

[23:29] uh whatever the reason for the collapse

[23:32] was after that they might have believed

[23:34] that there was no longer any negotiating

[23:35] tool. I'm not at least fair to families

[23:38] that are suffering so much in these

[23:40] cases. I cannot assure that they held

[23:42] these prisoners but if that document is

[23:44] authentic

[23:45] and it is hard to imagine who would have

[23:48] forged it for what purpose

[23:50] uh

[23:51] then I think

[23:53] uh

[23:54] enormous crime has been committed and uh

[23:58] then we should we I do not see how we

[24:01] can proceed in normalizing relations

[24:03] until this is fully cleared up.

[24:05] Uh Dr. Morris, you

[24:07] presented this document when you found

[24:09] it to the or you told the Clinton

[24:11] administration about it, National

[24:13] Security Council and others but I gather

[24:15] from reports that you got very little

[24:17] they showed very little interest in it

[24:19] at first. Is that correct? Um well, I

[24:22] tried to bring it to the attention of

[24:24] the highest possible officials of the US

[24:26] government because I felt that the

[24:29] document that I had found was not the

[24:31] end of the story, it was the beginning

[24:32] of the story.

[24:34] And the questions you have raised and

[24:35] which have been answered with the

[24:37] hypothesis of Dr. Brzezinski

[24:39] can be confirmed or denied by documents

[24:43] for example citing execution. The

[24:45] communists are very methodical

[24:47] about documenting all their actions. If

[24:49] they decided to execute um 700 American

[24:53] prisoners, there will be a document

[24:54] ordering the execution. And I believe

[24:56] that as I said before given the close

[24:58] relationship between the Soviet and the

[25:01] Vietnamese leadership during these

[25:02] years, the Soviets would know about it

[25:04] and there is a document in the Soviet

[25:06] archive.

[25:07] And I the reason I went to the Clinton

[25:09] >> You're saying there should be a

[25:10] document.

[25:11] >> be a document in the Soviet archives

[25:13] passed on by a Vietnamese informant to a

[25:15] Soviet

[25:16] representative in Hanoi. Mhm. Now,

[25:18] therefore I felt that the road to

[25:21] resolving this problem lies not in Hanoi

[25:23] but in Moscow. And I believe that

[25:25] sending General Vessey is

[25:27] a foolish

[25:29] enterprise if the purpose is to find out

[25:31] what happened to the 700 American

[25:33] prisoners.

[25:33] >> General Vessey, the retired general is

[25:35] the president's special envoy to Hanoi.

[25:37] Yes, that's right. I mean I think that

[25:40] if the president of the United States

[25:42] wants to express his outrage at this

[25:45] there are other ways of doing it. I mean

[25:46] there's a basic question he has to ask.

[25:49] Um what has happened to the 700

[25:51] Americans? But if he really wants to

[25:52] find out

[25:54] um the answer will be found in the

[25:55] Russian archives and that's why I went

[25:56] to the Clinton administration to try and

[25:59] encourage them to take moves discreetly

[26:02] discreetly

[26:03] to get the Soviets to the Russians I

[26:06] should say to open other archives to

[26:08] which I don't now have access.

[26:10] And I felt that um

[26:12] uh whilst there was great interest for

[26:14] example in the Department of Defense in

[26:15] seeing the document there was no

[26:17] interest or very little interest that I

[26:19] could see either in Defense or in the

[26:21] National Security Council in proceeding

[26:23] along the path that I had suggested to

[26:25] find the rest of the paper trail.

[26:26] Uh-huh. Dr. Brzezinski

[26:30] what what kind of new condition does the

[26:32] presence of this document create for

[26:35] normalizing relations with Viet with

[26:37] Vietnam in your view? Well, first of

[26:39] all, let me just make one comment on the

[26:41] Russian aspect of it. I think we have to

[26:43] give credit to the current Russian

[26:45] government for being willing to face up

[26:47] to the truth as far as this document is

[26:49] concerned. And I'm sure it wasn't easy

[26:52] and I think we have to credit them for

[26:53] their goodwill and openness and

[26:55] hopefully they'll pursue the issue

[26:56] further.

[26:57] As far as Vietnam is concerned

[27:01] I think that if this document is

[27:03] sustained and it looks

[27:05] unfortunately

[27:07] to be sustainable

[27:09] we have the right to ask the present

[27:11] Vietnamese government to place those

[27:14] responsible on war crimes trials. There

[27:16] has been some change in the composition

[27:18] of that government. Communist

[27:20] governments have a unique capacity to

[27:22] rewrite past history and to condemn

[27:25] their predecessors.

[27:26] At the very least there should be some

[27:29] sort of a moral accounting

[27:31] similar to the one that the Russians for

[27:33] example gave with respect to the Polish

[27:35] officers when they acknowledged to the

[27:37] Poles ultimately that they did it and

[27:39] that Gorbachev did that a couple of

[27:41] years ago.

[27:42] >> Exactly and that they regretted it and

[27:43] it was their criminal predecessors that

[27:45] did it.

[27:46] At least some moral satisfaction is owed

[27:48] the United States

[27:50] and a great deal of that is owed

[27:51] directly to the families involved who

[27:53] have suffered so much for so long and

[27:56] have so often been rebuffed even by

[27:58] parts

[27:59] of the US bureaucracy. Dr. Kissinger,

[28:02] what's your view on what factor this is

[28:05] in the attempt to normalize relations?

[28:07] Well, I don't think that we can

[28:09] normalize relations or ease conditions

[28:12] in international agencies until we have

[28:15] uh cleared up this issue.

[28:17] Uh one way to do it is to ask the

[28:19] Vietnamese

[28:20] who who deserves credit for producing

[28:22] this document

[28:24] to produce other documents that are

[28:26] relevant to American prisoners because

[28:27] they must have many more.

[28:29] Uh another one is perhaps to re-question

[28:32] our own prisoners

[28:34] uh the returned prisoners to see

[28:36] how much of that document can be

[28:38] sustained

[28:39] from what they know. I mean, were these

[28:41] prisoners do they know of any separation

[28:43] of prisoners

[28:44] uh and uh and similar matters.

[28:48] Uh but I don't see how we can proceed uh

[28:52] with North Vietnamese or with Vietnamese

[28:54] normalization

[28:56] until this question is cleared up and I

[28:57] think

[28:59] uh if it should be this document should

[29:01] be authenticated some of the measures

[29:03] that

[29:04] uh Dr. Brzezinski put forward

[29:07] would be very appropriate.

[29:10] Well, Dr. Kissinger, Dr. Brzezinski,

[29:12] stay with us because we're going to move

[29:13] on. Judy.

[29:25] Now we turn to the story in Bosnia.

[29:27] Today 800 Muslims were evacuated from

[29:30] the town of Srebrenica which came under

[29:32] Serb artillery fire on Monday. Food

[29:35] supplies are running low throughout the

[29:37] country. We have a report from Eastern

[29:39] Bosnia by Jane Bennett Powell of

[29:41] Independent Television News.

[29:44] The convoy seen here at Bratunac

[29:47] Serb-held territory was given relatively

[29:49] uninterrupted passage on the journey

[29:51] from Srebrenica according to the UN High

[29:53] Commissioner for Refugees tonight.

[29:57] A search was carried out here, but the

[29:59] speed of their journey indicates few

[30:01] delays for the evacuees.

[30:03] Fewer than a tenth of them are wounded,

[30:05] suggesting many of last night's injured

[30:07] are still in Srebrenica.

[30:11] Only six trucks took aid into the town

[30:13] where food supplies are low and the

[30:15] water is thought to be infected. The

[30:17] fear is that rising panic may have led

[30:19] to another storming of the six trucks,

[30:21] which then transferred some of their

[30:22] human cargo to make a more comfortable

[30:24] journey to Tuzla.

[30:27] When the amateur radio operators in

[30:29] Tuzla last made contact with Srebrenica

[30:31] late last night, it was to hear how the

[30:33] 6,000 inhabitants and 34,000 or so

[30:36] refugees who are now there took hours of

[30:38] shelling by the Serbs who surround them.

[30:44] The feeling is that all old men help us

[30:46] and two o'clock this afternoon there's

[30:48] been multiple killings and bombardments.

[30:50] What I've heard is that especially

[30:53] the the school the refugee place is is

[30:55] hit quite severely where about thousand

[30:57] people are living at this moment. It's

[30:59] also close to the hospital. I had no

[31:01] information how bad the hospital was

[31:03] damaged, but it's it's clear that that

[31:05] especially that center was was hit.

[31:09] If Srebrenica is the most prominent

[31:11] instance of life under siege in Bosnia,

[31:13] it's not the only one. Thousands of

[31:15] villagers still live on the front line,

[31:17] staying on to defend their homes,

[31:19] reluctant human shields.

[31:23] 7 km along from where the Srebrenica

[31:25] convoys cross into territory held by the

[31:27] Bosnian government, the Serbs have tried

[31:29] to advance and nearly cut off the pocket

[31:32] of land.

[31:34] In Jajce, sheltered to some degree by

[31:36] the brow of the hill, the inhabitants

[31:38] live on. Their fear that if they leave,

[31:41] the soldiers would have no will to fight

[31:42] on and that the Serbs would sweep in and

[31:45] burn their homes.

[31:50] Men here say the UN Security Council,

[31:53] which is due to discuss the arms embargo

[31:55] soon, should lift it so they can fight

[31:57] the war on a level playing field.

[32:00] They're dismayed that the British

[32:01] Foreign Secretary for one has said it

[32:03] would merely create a level killing

[32:05] field.

[32:07] The local commander here doesn't believe

[32:09] it would escalate the war.

[32:13] It won't. It'll just balance things out

[32:15] with the enemy.

[32:16] And it will help to end the war more

[32:18] quickly.

[32:19] We have the will and the power and time

[32:22] now.

[32:23] Everything to get back our territory.

[32:29] Whether more arms would end the war or

[32:31] merely escalate it, many Bosnians share

[32:34] the view of the UN special envoy here

[32:36] that the solution to the killing in

[32:38] front line villages is not to evacuate

[32:40] women and children, but to enforce the

[32:42] cease-fire.

[32:44] Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski

[32:46] are back with us now to discuss the

[32:48] situation in Bosnia.

[32:50] Dr. Brzezinski, is there any rational

[32:52] explanation for this latest attack by

[32:55] the Serb forces on the town of

[32:56] Srebrenica and on Sarajevo where you

[32:58] have mostly civilians with little

[33:01] military defense? Well, there is a

[33:04] rational explanation. It's an immoral

[33:06] one. It's an unacceptable one, but there

[33:09] is. Namely, the Serbs are feeding their

[33:11] oats.

[33:12] They have concluded that the

[33:14] international community,

[33:16] the United States in the forefront,

[33:18] have neither the will nor the guts

[33:21] nor the motivation

[33:23] to take care of this problem.

[33:25] We're dealing here, I think, with a

[33:27] massive moral and geopolitical failure,

[33:31] an outrage in fact,

[33:33] and I think the Serbs are conscious

[33:35] of what is happening on the ground and

[33:38] are exploiting it.

[33:39] Dr. Kissinger, do you see it the same

[33:41] way?

[33:42] Uh I think what the Serbs are doing is a

[33:45] moral outrage.

[33:46] Uh

[33:47] I have

[33:49] more difficulty

[33:51] trying to understand what it is that

[33:54] the United States is supposed to do

[33:56] militarily

[33:58] in order to resist it.

[34:01] And I am very uneasy about starting

[34:04] military operations whose nature I

[34:06] cannot describe

[34:08] and whose end result

[34:11] uh

[34:12] uh is not calculable from the statements

[34:14] of some of the advocates.

[34:16] Uh

[34:17] I uh

[34:18] this is my this is my concern about uh

[34:23] about military operations. If we wanted

[34:25] to say

[34:27] that we insist on a cease-fire and that

[34:29] we will

[34:31] resist any new military operation, that

[34:34] we will confine our actions to that,

[34:37] uh I could support this, but I would be

[34:39] reluctant to see

[34:41] significant American ground operations

[34:44] in an area that's far removed

[34:48] from the United States and

[34:51] uh

[34:51] for which I cannot

[34:53] visualize what the end would be

[34:57] uh because having just gone through this

[34:58] Vietnam discussion,

[35:00] I do not want to see another repetition

[35:02] of a similar situation, but I agree

[35:04] completely

[35:05] with what Brzezinski said that the what

[35:08] the Serbs are doing

[35:10] is a moral and human outrage.

[35:12] >> Well, since you've gone ahead and

[35:13] brought up the prospect of the

[35:15] discussion of of the use of potential

[35:18] use of US military force, is that the

[35:21] only thing is outside military force in

[35:24] your view the only thing that could stop

[35:25] the course of events over there now? You

[35:27] know, actually I believe that if the

[35:29] United States and Western Europe

[35:30] together had taken a tough stance and

[35:33] indicated a willingness to use force,

[35:35] the Serbs would have backed off. Earlier

[35:37] on.

[35:37] >> Yes, because there is not unanimity in

[35:40] Serbia on behalf of the war. Significant

[35:42] segments of Serbian population are

[35:45] uneasy, troubled and worried.

[35:48] But we didn't do that. Nor can we do it

[35:50] now. The political fact is there's no

[35:53] willingness in the United States to do

[35:54] it, nor in Europe.

[35:56] And therefore in that context,

[35:58] attempting to put American troops in

[36:00] probably doesn't make much sense. But

[36:03] this doesn't mean that we couldn't do

[36:04] some other things which would be at

[36:06] least partial responses. One, really

[36:09] enforce the no-fly zone.

[36:11] This present attempt at enforcement, so

[36:13] much delayed, is really a joke if you

[36:15] look at the rules of engagement. Two, we

[36:18] should put troops in now in southern

[36:20] Macedonia

[36:21] and Kosovo or in Albania next to Kosovo

[36:24] to both deter the war.

[36:25] >> of the former Yugoslavia. Exactly. And

[36:27] three, we should provide arms, lift the

[36:30] embargo on the Bosnians. When the

[36:32] British secretary says Do you really

[36:34] believe at this late date that those

[36:35] actions would make a difference?

[36:37] >> Yes, they are asking for it. You know,

[36:39] during World War II, we provided arms to

[36:42] resistance movements in Europe, but we

[36:44] failed to provide it to the Jews.

[36:46] And we didn't expect them to defeat the

[36:48] Nazis, but we felt they at least had a

[36:49] chance and the right to defend

[36:51] themselves. And the Bosnians are

[36:53] convinced that they had arms they would

[36:55] do better. The Croats have had access to

[36:57] arms and in the last year, the

[36:59] Croatian-Serbian situation has become

[37:02] more stable. Dr. Brze- Dr. Kissinger, do

[37:04] you think the steps that Dr. Brzezinski

[37:06] is describing would make a real

[37:07] difference at this point?

[37:08] >> Well, I uh uh I recommended last

[37:12] September

[37:13] that

[37:14] uh

[37:15] unless there were an immediate

[37:16] cease-fire that the arms embargo should

[37:19] be lifted.

[37:20] So, this is a step that I favor. I favor

[37:23] enforcement of the no-fly zone

[37:25] and a strict uh the strictest military

[37:28] embargo

[37:30] uh that could be carried out and at some

[37:32] point we should consider breaking

[37:33] diplomatic relations

[37:35] with Yugoslavia if uh if these uh

[37:39] measures continue. My opposition is to

[37:42] ground forces and open-ended military

[37:44] action. But meanwhile

[37:45] >> we seem to agree on actually. But

[37:48] meanwhile, you have uh the continued uh

[37:51] killing of of so many people, most of

[37:54] them civilians,

[37:55] uh in in these all many of these towns

[37:57] in eastern Bosnia, not just Srebrenica,

[37:59] but Sarajevo continues to be under

[38:01] attack. Is there anything that could be

[38:03] done just from a humanitarian standpoint

[38:05] for these people? Or uh is that just uh

[38:09] uh idealistic thinking on the part of uh

[38:11] some Americans who are concerned?

[38:15] Is the question addressed to me? To you,

[38:16] yeah. Uh the uh

[38:21] uh great efforts have been made for

[38:23] humanitarian assistance.

[38:26] And

[38:27] uh

[38:28] uh I cannot think of any additional

[38:30] humanitarian aid that can be given.

[38:33] Uh although

[38:34] obviously as many supplies as we can get

[38:36] in there should be done.

[38:38] Uh

[38:39] it seems to me that what the Serbs are

[38:41] trying to do is to take

[38:44] uh

[38:45] all contiguous areas and to shrink the

[38:47] Muslim area to the smallest uh uh

[38:51] dimensions possible and maybe eliminate

[38:53] it

[38:53] uh altogether and this produces

[38:56] extraordinary suffering.

[38:59] Uh and I don't think it can be dealt

[39:00] with by humanitarian aid alone.

[39:03] What about this this this question, Dr.

[39:05] Brzezinski, of is there anything else

[39:07] that can be done from a humanitarian

[39:09] standpoint? I mean, you're talking about

[39:10] in in specifically enforcing the no-fly

[39:12] >> Well, sure, you know, we could increase

[39:14] our air drops. We could increase the

[39:17] amount of food or medicine that's being

[39:19] shipped in there because they're running

[39:21] low on it and the West Europeans are not

[39:22] providing enough. And for that matter,

[39:24] we aren't providing enough.

[39:26] But this would be like dropping food

[39:28] packages into Auschwitz.

[39:30] I think the issue has to be faced.

[39:33] If people is being slaughtered,

[39:35] country is being overrun,

[39:37] and not just anywhere, but in the heart

[39:39] of Europe, that part of humanity which

[39:41] are allegedly subject to some degree of

[39:44] international legitimacy

[39:46] and the powers to be, the United States,

[39:48] Western Europe are watching it. I

[39:50] consider this to be a failure that's

[39:52] bipartisan nature. The Bush

[39:54] administration didn't respond. The

[39:56] Clinton administration in spite of its

[39:58] noises during the campaign is not

[40:00] responding and therefore this is a

[40:02] failure of all of us and we don't have

[40:04] to intervene massively with American

[40:06] soldiers to be doing something. We could

[40:08] be doing more along the lines of the

[40:10] three-pronged approach that I have

[40:12] advocated.

[40:12] >> And just recently you've had the the

[40:14] Clinton administration urging United

[40:15] Nations to put off a vote on the

[40:18] sanctions against Serbia until Yeltsin's

[40:22] fate is determined. Is that the right

[40:23] priority?

[40:24] >> Well, in effect we are propitiating

[40:25] Yeltsin on this issue having lost a

[40:27] great deal of time because in the past

[40:30] the Russians were far more malleable

[40:32] than they are today. They'll be less

[40:34] malleable in the future. The problems

[40:36] are going to be easier to solve and in

[40:38] the meantime we're establishing a

[40:40] terrible international precedent for

[40:43] ethnic cleansing and for the unilateral

[40:45] use of force.

[40:45] >> Is this a terrible precedent, Dr.

[40:48] Kissinger, for this sort of solution to

[40:51] take place when there are territorial or

[40:54] in-country disagreements disputes

[40:57] like this one in the future?

[41:00] Whether it's in Europe or the former

[41:01] Soviet Union.

[41:02] >> I think it is it could turn in Yes, it

[41:05] probably already is a

[41:07] a bad precedent.

[41:10] I think what is needed

[41:12] is for the United States to state

[41:14] comprehensively what it wants and what

[41:17] it is willing to do. I am

[41:20] I do not believe that little measures

[41:22] like in increasing the air drops or

[41:25] doing individual sub-cap measures are

[41:27] going to be able to deal with this

[41:29] problem.

[41:31] Uh we have to put forward some

[41:32] comprehensive

[41:34] requirement of what we want. What we

[41:36] really want is an end to military

[41:38] operations. If that can be achieved then

[41:41] the humanitarian

[41:43] the increase in humanitarian aid is

[41:46] relatively easy.

[41:48] The Serbs would gain from this what they

[41:50] have already conquered.

[41:52] Uh but at least the killing would stop.

[41:55] When I'm sorry, you said if all that

[41:57] would happen if if we if the United

[41:59] States would state and uh

[42:01] >> I think we should say that we will break

[42:02] diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia,

[42:05] that we will

[42:06] blockade

[42:08] the former Yugoslavia that is Belgrade,

[42:10] that we will blockade the countries that

[42:12] we

[42:13] we

[42:14] invite immediately the creation by NATO

[42:18] of some military command that will try

[42:19] to enforce a cease-fire

[42:21] and to enforce the no-fly zone. If we

[42:24] try to create that military command

[42:26] incidentally, we will see who shows up

[42:28] and I don't think there will be all that

[42:30] many. Uh but we should not create the

[42:32] impression that American ground forces

[42:34] can be used. Uh but just quickly, Dr.

[42:36] Brzezinski, is that going to make a

[42:38] difference just like what Dr. the kind

[42:41] of thing Dr. Kissinger's recommending?

[42:42] >> Well, if we were willing to do it, it

[42:44] would make a difference, but I'm not

[42:45] sure we're willing to do it. But because

[42:48] we're not willing to do that, it doesn't

[42:49] mean we should do nothing and I think if

[42:51] we were at least willing to give the

[42:53] Bosnians a better chance of fighting, it

[42:55] would increase the pressure on the Serbs

[42:57] to accommodate because the Serbs are not

[42:59] omnipotent. They have several fronts in

[43:01] which to fight and more effective

[43:03] resistance would create some sort of

[43:05] stalemate on the ground.

[43:07] Well, Dr. Brzezinski, Dr. Kissinger,

[43:09] thank you both for being with us.

[43:20] Next tonight, the response inside South

[43:22] Africa to the weekend murder of one of

[43:24] that country's principal black leaders,

[43:26] Chris Hani. Hani, a former official of

[43:29] the African National Congress and

[43:30] general secretary of the Communist

[43:32] Party, was shot to death on Sunday. A

[43:35] white man has been charged. Now both the

[43:37] white government and the African

[43:38] National Congress are trying to contain

[43:40] the anger among the country's majority

[43:42] black population. Nelson Mandela warned

[43:45] that the country was on the brink of

[43:46] disaster. We have a report from Judy

[43:48] Aslett of Independent Television News.

[43:53] The anger generated by the murder of

[43:55] Chris Hani is already gaining momentum.

[43:58] Outside Boksburg Magistrate's Court this

[44:01] morning where Hani's alleged killer made

[44:03] his first appearance, thousands of

[44:05] protesters were matched by an

[44:07] unprecedented police presence.

[44:09] As the armed convoy left taking Jan

[44:12] Valusz back to jail, the focus of that

[44:14] anger was against the government.

[44:17] As more details of who Chris Hani's

[44:19] killer was are uncovered, the ANC

[44:22] leadership is convinced the man was not

[44:24] acting alone and must have had

[44:26] connections with the security forces.

[44:29] This killer

[44:31] was issued

[44:33] with a submachine gun.

[44:36] I couldn't hear properly.

[44:38] He has got a license for that.

[44:40] In terms of law in this country

[44:42] no civilian is supposed to be having

[44:45] that type of an arm.

[44:47] Who authorized this man to carry that

[44:49] weapon? Is he not part of the special

[44:51] force?

[44:52] Another link with the security forces is

[44:55] that the gun that police say was used to

[44:57] kill Chris Hani came from this cache

[45:00] stolen 3 years ago from the South

[45:01] African Air Force headquarters.

[45:04] At the time Chris Hani was critical of

[45:06] how easy it had been for right-wingers

[45:08] to get hold of the gun.

[45:11] Either this man himself stole the

[45:12] weapons, in which case he's got contacts

[45:15] who opened up for him at the

[45:16] air force base. If he didn't do it, who

[45:19] did it for him? It's unavoidable I think

[45:21] that suspicions are going to be cast on

[45:24] institutions within the state

[45:26] regardless of whether the government

[45:28] itself was involved or not.

[45:31] And it's going to be extremely difficult

[45:32] for the government to completely reject

[45:35] all of those accusations that have

[45:37] already started being that people have

[45:39] already made.

[45:41] Tonight though, the government is

[45:43] continuing to deny that they had

[45:45] anything to do with Chris Hani's murder.

[45:48] As far as the allegation concerning the

[45:50] government is concerned, there we

[45:52] categorically state that we have not as

[45:54] a government been involved in any

[45:56] conspiracy.

[45:58] In the townships, any denials from the

[46:00] government is already falling on deaf

[46:02] ears.

[46:03] Last night news in the Eastern Cape,

[46:06] protesters bombed the police caspers.

[46:09] Burning roads blocked, but also warned

[46:11] outsiders, particularly whites, that

[46:13] they're not welcome in the area.

[46:17] And it's this anti-white feeling that

[46:19] the ANC leadership is trying to contain.

[46:22] The most volatile group is the ANC Youth

[46:25] League who've been holding rallies and

[46:27] marches for the past 3 days.

[46:30] Many of them now feel that talk to the

[46:32] government should be called off.

[46:34] I think it would be very very wise for

[46:37] the African National Congress

[46:39] to suspend or to pull out totally and

[46:42] completely from negotiation.

[46:44] I think now is the time where we, the

[46:46] African National Congress Youth League,

[46:49] would stand up

[46:52] and fight the enemy. We are going to

[46:54] hold the the decisive responsibility

[46:56] because we feel that they are cheating

[46:58] us. We are negotiating at the same time

[47:00] they are busy killing us.

[47:02] Despite the ANC leadership's call for

[47:04] calm, it's clear the militant wing of

[47:07] the ANC is gaining strength.

[47:09] The pressure now is on the leadership to

[47:12] recognize that anger and channel it into

[47:14] organized marches and protests.

[47:19] In the past, Chris Hani was seen as the

[47:22] one man in the leadership of the ANC who

[47:24] could keep the youth wing under control.

[47:27] His peculiar mixture of being the

[47:29] long-time head of the ANC army, Umkhonto

[47:32] we Sizwe, as well as a key negotiator

[47:35] made him the link between the militants

[47:38] and those involved with the reform

[47:40] process.

[47:41] With his death, the ANC lost that vital

[47:44] link and many now feel the organization

[47:47] will have to change in order to keep the

[47:49] youth on side. One of the mistakes that

[47:52] we have made as an organization was to

[47:54] elevate negotiation and not to take care

[47:57] of other pillars of struggle like the

[48:00] pillar of mass action. That's the

[48:02] mistake. Uh it has been used like a tap

[48:04] of water. Uh that is one of the major

[48:07] mistakes that we as ANC have made and

[48:11] death of Chris Hani

[48:12] should mean that we change that kind of

[48:14] an approach.

[48:16] Already there are plans for more mass

[48:18] action with a national stayaway set for

[48:21] tomorrow.

[48:22] The test now is whether Mr. Mandela,

[48:24] tonight meeting Chris Hani's father, can

[48:27] keep those protests peaceful.

[48:38] Finally tonight, Roberta Smith Wallach,

[48:40] art critic for New York Newsday, reports

[48:43] on two New York exhibits which have

[48:45] different views of what is art.

[48:48] Is this videotape footage art?

[48:51] And is George Holliday, the man who shot

[48:53] it, an artist?

[48:55] New York's Whitney Museum of American

[48:57] Art says, yes.

[49:00] Can you make a work of art out of a

[49:02] stuffed black wife beating

[49:04] or skin color?

[49:06] How about phone sex?

[49:08] Sticking a quarter and dialing into

[49:10] someone's fantasy.

[49:12] For some time now, people who call

[49:15] themselves artists have been trying to

[49:17] make art out of subjects like these.

[49:20] Take this year's Whitney Biennial. Ever

[49:22] since the Whitney inaugurated its every

[49:24] 2-year survey of what's hot in

[49:26] contemporary art 60 years ago, it's been

[49:29] notoriously controversial. But never has

[49:32] it so self-consciously invited outrage

[49:35] as this year.

[49:38] The Whitney has transplanted from the

[49:40] margins of society to the art world's

[49:42] equivalent of Broadway, a kind of

[49:45] socially engaged, in-your-face art by

[49:48] women, Hispanics, homosexuals,

[49:51] the disenfranchised who are mad about

[49:53] something and they aren't going to take

[49:55] it anymore.

[49:56] You begin to get the message the minute

[49:58] you pay your money and put on your

[50:00] admissions button designed by artist

[50:03] Daniel J. Martinez.

[50:06] This survey of art of the last 2 years

[50:09] comes out of a world in which the

[50:11] economy staggered,

[50:13] Los Angeles burned, and the art market

[50:16] collapsed.

[50:17] And through video, sculpture,

[50:20] installations, and photography,

[50:22] these artists are engaging the same

[50:24] tough issues that have focused the

[50:26] attention of politicians and talk show

[50:29] hosts.

[50:30] So, the question is,

[50:32] can art show us anything we haven't

[50:34] already seen on Oprah Winfrey?

[50:37] Maybe.

[50:39] Maybe Pepon Osorio really can introduce

[50:42] us into the heart of the Hispanic dream

[50:44] with his baroque fantasy of a living

[50:46] room and dining room in which a murder

[50:49] has been committed.

[50:51] Shelves of videos outside the room

[50:53] remind us of the violent movie

[50:55] stereotypes of Hispanics to compare with

[50:58] his richly imagined and observed

[51:00] reality.

[51:02] Maybe the wily and erudite Cherokee

[51:04] activist Jimmie Durham really can make

[51:07] us rethink our disdain for romanticizing

[51:10] of the noble savage.

[51:13] He's constructed witty sculptures out of

[51:15] hybrids of Coke bottles, engine parts,

[51:18] industrial hoses that he's assembled to

[51:21] suggest guns and cannons, but also

[51:24] fetishes, fertility symbols, in other

[51:27] words, primitive souvenirs.

[51:30] But what about that Rodney King footage?

[51:40] It certainly changed our world if that's

[51:42] what art's meant to do.

[51:44] And the documentary video in the

[51:45] exhibition that uses it repeatedly

[51:48] certainly demonstrates why and how.

[51:51] But can a documentary,

[51:53] no matter how persuasive and

[51:54] enlightening, be considered art?

[51:58] For hundreds of years in the West, with

[52:00] time out for the Middle Ages, there'd

[52:02] been a consensus about what constituted

[52:04] art.

[52:05] It had been defined in what was

[52:07] considered its finest hour,

[52:09] in 5th century Athens,

[52:11] when the Kritios Boy took art's first

[52:14] breathtakingly natural step into one of

[52:17] the first great moments of Western

[52:19] civilization.

[52:22] Before him,

[52:23] statues stood stiff and distantly

[52:25] godlike in the Egyptian manner.

[52:28] Slowly they developed the muscles,

[52:31] the weight of a leg

[52:32] that could come only from interested

[52:34] study of the human body,

[52:37] until the Kritios Boy strode into a new

[52:40] age that was focused on man, not gods.

[52:44] By happy coincidence, the Kritios Boy is

[52:47] currently on view in New York at the

[52:49] Metropolitan Museum, just up the street

[52:51] from the Whitney Biennial, in a loan

[52:53] show from Greece called The Greek

[52:56] Miracle.

[52:57] The Greek Miracle, a term which itself

[53:00] has lately come under scholarly attack,

[53:02] was democracy.

[53:05] The Kritios Boy and what came next were

[53:08] perfect visual expressions of the idea

[53:11] on which democracy was built.

[53:14] It was an idea that said that the key to

[53:16] existence lay in a knowledge of the mind

[53:19] and spirit of man,

[53:21] not in the contemplation of abstract,

[53:23] unknowable spiritual forces.

[53:26] Even then, the idea was riddled with as

[53:28] many contradictions as Athens' own

[53:31] imperialistic democracy,

[53:33] but the concept endured.

[53:35] And after the Renaissance, it became the

[53:37] standard of European art

[53:40] until the 20th century began to invite

[53:42] in other ideas

[53:44] from Africa, the Far East, and the

[53:46] Americas.

[53:48] Even now, though, with Western

[53:50] civilization on the defensive,

[53:53] the Kritios Boy has something to teach

[53:55] us about the definition of art,

[53:58] and the definition turns out to be the

[53:59] same for every culture and every age.

[54:03] A great, even a successful work of art

[54:06] is one in which an idea has found its

[54:09] perfect visual form.

[54:12] Marble may not be the perfect medium in

[54:14] which to express ideas about our

[54:16] disoriented, dysfunctional, dizzyingly

[54:19] shifting world.

[54:21] Does that mean that George Holliday's

[54:23] home video is?

[54:25] You decide.

[54:28] I'm Am I Waller.

[54:38] Once again, the main stories of this

[54:39] Tuesday, the United Nations aid convoy

[54:42] evacuated 800 Muslim refugees from the

[54:45] Bosnian town of Srebrenica. They

[54:48] included dozens who were wounded when

[54:50] Serb shells pounded the town yesterday.

[54:53] At least 56 people were killed in the

[54:55] attack.

[54:56] Good night, Robin. Good night, Judy.

[54:58] That's the NewsHour tonight and we'll be

[55:00] back with you tomorrow night. I'm Robert

[55:01] MacNeil. Good night.

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[55:35] And viewers like you.

[55:38] I'm Nancy Marshall with OPB Radio.

[55:41] Tomorrow morning from 5:00 to 9:00 on

[55:43] OPB Radio, it's Morning Edition.

[55:45] Tomorrow we discuss the differing

[55:46] approaches of the US and Japan toward

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[57:14] Join us later tonight for Newsroom 6 at

[57:15] 11:00. Some encouraging news to report

[57:17] tonight about women and menopause. A new

[57:20] treatment is helping lots of women feel

[57:22] better. It may also help them live

[57:24] longer, but there are risks and we'll

[57:26] tell you the pros and cons. Also

[57:28] tonight, Ed Whelan will save all the

[57:29] great plays from sports and Randy's

[57:31] up-to-the-minute forecast. See you at

[57:33] 11:00. It's time for spring cleaning.

[57:35] Time to scrub away the grime, making

[57:38] certain that family vehicle is shiny and

[57:40] bright. Which led Ray Summers to replace

[57:42] a line Southeast Division.

[57:47] I bought all these old '64 Chevrolet SS

[57:51] spinners.

[57:53] I probably got about

[57:55] 10 sets of them in stock now. You can't

[57:58] sell it if you don't have it. Dick

[58:00] McCormick knows that is true.

[58:04] I've got Ford or Olds

[58:06] Even for hubcaps. Kevin knows he has

[58:08] plenty of them. Back here we got a

[58:10] Pontiac room. A Pontiac room and a

[58:13] foreign car wing. And every year a

[58:15] passel of new hubcaps to add to the old.

[58:18] Running out of room already.

[58:20] Started out with a thousand square feet

[58:23] uh 7 years ago and I'm got a 4,000

[58:26] square feet now and I'm just about out

[58:28] of room.

[58:29] A businessman's lament. Chrysler, 14-in.

[58:33] How nice a one you want?

[58:36] You do have a center

[58:37] >> See the one that's on there. You do have

[58:38] a center for it or you need a center,

[58:40] too?

[58:41] You're probably looking at about $50 for

[58:45] just the wheel cover. If you haven't

[58:47] priced wheel covers since you were a

[58:48] teenager, you may be surprised. Older

[58:51] people think that they're still going to

[58:53] a wrecking yard and buying them for $5

[58:56] and that's a thing of the past.

[58:58] Of course, a thing of the past is what

[59:00] some people want. I had a call for a '37

[59:03] Dodge pickup truck the other day. Didn't

[59:04] know for sure what it really looked

[59:07] like, but I had a Dodge right above the

[59:08] door. I pulled it down. He said, "Like

[59:10] this?" And he said, "Hey, that's the

[59:11] right one." Dick McCormick started years

[59:14] ago with a wrecking yard. The wrecking

[59:16] yard is gone, now just hubcaps.

[59:19] Studebakers, Packards,

[59:21] little bit of everything. Spring is

[59:23] good. People wash cars, find a wheel

[59:26] cover missing. And then they start

[59:27] looking for me. Even people with

[59:29] Rolls-Royces. It's a good game. There's

[59:31] a lot of people out there need hubcaps.

[59:34] Enough to keep a fellow busy.

[59:37] Yes, I do. I have some nice ones for $35

[59:39] a piece.

[59:41] Ray Summers at Large with photographer

[59:42] John Keller, Southeast Portland.

[59:45] Some of those hubcaps he showed us will

[59:46] bring more than $100. Is that right?

[59:49] >> They tell me. The guy sells hubcaps with

[59:51] scratches and dents to the recyclers and

[59:53] he washes and polishes the good one and

[59:55] he puts them up for sale. And Ray tells

[59:57] us that some people actually buy them

[59:58] for wall decorations.

[60:00] Something to remind them of a car they

[60:02] owned 40 years ago or so. Cherish that

[60:04] Chevy.

[60:05] Randy, quick 4-day, 5-day forecast?

[60:08] Well, the the 3-hour forecast calls for

[60:10] rain and then beyond that we get into a

[60:12] pattern where the rain ends and then it

[60:13] begins again and then it begins or ends.

[60:16] Which one did I leave off with? Well,

[60:17] you get the picture. It's going to be

[60:18] raining off off on and off through the

[60:21] weekend. A staggering forecast, hard to

[60:23] comprehend for me. So, we need two or

[60:25] three rain gauges to handle all of that.

[60:26] >> Yeah. We'll see what you have to say at

[60:27] 11:00, too. Hopefully, you'll join us

[60:29] then. Good night.