CBS News Special Report - 2003-03-17 - 10:46 a.m. (E)

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Transcript

Language: English (original, YouTube automatic captions)

[0:00] report. Good morning, Anthony Mason

[0:01] reporting from CBS News headquarters in

[0:03] New York. Good morning. US Secretary of

[0:05] State Coen Powell is about to brief

[0:07] reporters on the latest in the showdown

[0:09] with Iraq Saddam Hussein. Diplomatic

[0:11] efforts to solve the crisis between the

[0:13] US and Iraq are beginning to shut down.

[0:16] Earlier this morning at the UN, the US,

[0:18] Great Britain, and Spain withdrew a

[0:20] proposed resolution giving Iraq one more

[0:22] chance to disarm. President Bush will

[0:25] address the nation at 8:00 p.m. Eastern

[0:27] time tonight. He's expected to give

[0:29] Saddam Hussein and his regime an

[0:31] ultimatum to disarm or face a US-led

[0:33] military attack within days. Here is

[0:35] Secretary of State.

[0:36] >> Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

[0:38] >> As you know, last fall in an act of

[0:41] unonymity, the Security Council came

[0:43] together following President Bush's

[0:46] historic speech to the United Nations on

[0:48] the 12th of September. And on the 8th of

[0:50] November, after long negotiations uh

[0:53] passed UN resolution 1441

[0:57] by unanimous vote 15 to zero, not one

[1:00] member failing to raise a hand in

[1:03] support of that resolution. In the

[1:05] months after the passage of UN

[1:07] resolution 1441,

[1:10] we watched as the inspectors began their

[1:12] work and we were immediately concerned

[1:15] that Iraq was not going to understand

[1:17] the intention of 1441 when Iraq

[1:20] submitted 30 days later a declaration

[1:23] that can only be said to be false, not

[1:25] complete, rather incomplete, not

[1:28] truthful, untruthful, and nowhere near

[1:31] meeting the spirit intended

[1:34] in 1441.

[1:36] We call that out to the international

[1:38] community at that time. We said we

[1:41] believe that that false declaration was

[1:43] a material breach. We continued to

[1:45] support the inspectors. We continued to

[1:47] watch and although we have seen some

[1:50] process improvements and some grudging

[1:53] movement on the part of Sodom Hussein's

[1:55] regime to provide some information and

[1:58] provide some equipment to the

[2:00] inspectors. It certainly wasn't the kind

[2:03] of compliance and total cooperation that

[2:06] 1441 required and that we were hoping

[2:10] but had no illusions about Iraq being

[2:13] able to accept and respond to. As a

[2:17] result of this and as a result of a

[2:19] number of briefings that we received

[2:21] from UNMOVIC and IAEA

[2:23] uh a week and a half ago, the United

[2:25] Kingdom, the United States, and uh Spain

[2:29] uh put forward a resolution that would

[2:32] once again give Sodom Hussein one last

[2:35] chance to act or face the serious

[2:37] consequences that were authorized and

[2:39] clearly intended in UN resolution 1441.

[2:44] Unfortunately, over the last um roughly

[2:47] uh two weeks or thereabouts, a little

[2:48] less than two weeks, that we have

[2:49] debating this particular draft

[2:51] resolution. And despite best efforts to

[2:54] see whether or not language could be

[2:56] adjusted uh to make it more acceptable

[2:58] to council members, it is clear that

[3:01] there are some permanent members of the

[3:02] council that would veto any such

[3:04] resolution or any resolution resembling

[3:07] the one that the British tabled Friday

[3:09] before last at the United Nations. As a

[3:12] result of this, uh, the United Kingdom,

[3:14] the United States, and Spain decided to

[3:18] not call for a vote on this resolution.

[3:21] Um, we spent a great deal of time

[3:24] overnight uh and early this morning

[3:26] talking to friends and colleagues around

[3:29] the world about uh the resolution and it

[3:32] was our judgment reached by the United

[3:35] States, the United Kingdom and Spain

[3:37] that no further purpose would be served

[3:39] by pushing this resolution. So, we are

[3:42] not going to ask for a vote on the

[3:43] resolution. the resolution uh will uh

[3:47] die anyway because it had a built-in

[3:49] date of 17 March within the resolution

[3:52] which has not been modified. As you

[3:55] heard the president and the other

[3:57] leaders who assembled in the Azors

[4:00] yesterday for the Atlantic summit say

[4:02] the window on diplomacy is uh closing.

[4:06] Uh the moment of truth is arriving and

[4:09] you will hear a speech from the

[4:11] president thei of the United States this

[4:12] evening. President Bush will address the

[4:14] nation and the world on the situation as

[4:17] we now see it. Um in his speech, he

[4:20] clearly will issue an ultimatum to Sodom

[4:22] Hussein that the only way to avoid the

[4:24] serious consequences that were built

[4:28] into 1441 is for Sodom Hussein and his

[4:31] immediate cohort uh to leave the country

[4:34] and to allow uh this matter to be

[4:37] resolved through the peaceful entry of

[4:39] force and not a conflict. Nevertheless,

[4:42] um the president's determination will be

[4:43] made clear tonight that this matter

[4:45] cannot continue indefinitely that Sodom

[4:48] Hussein is guilty of the charges that

[4:51] have been brought against him previously

[4:53] through these many resolutions which

[4:55] acknowledged that he had weapons of mass

[4:57] destruction and he has failed to disarm

[5:01] himself as required by the various

[5:03] resolutions. We believe and I think um

[5:06] you've also heard an opinion from uh

[5:08] British legal authorities uh within the

[5:10] last 24 hours that there is sufficient

[5:13] authority in 1441 678 and 687 earlier

[5:19] resolutions for whatever military action

[5:22] might be required. I'm very very pleased

[5:24] that the council did come together last

[5:26] November 8th for 1441. of course

[5:29] disappointed that we were unable to get

[5:31] a subsequent resolution but we believe

[5:34] that our actions now are u supported by

[5:38] international law whatever actions we

[5:40] might take in the future and the

[5:42] president will talk to this issue

[5:44] tonight I won't say any more about the

[5:45] president's speech because the president

[5:47] of course will have the opportunity to

[5:49] speak for himself and uh make the points

[5:52] perfectly clear to the American people

[5:54] and to the international community.

[5:56] You'll also notice that in their

[5:58] statements yesterday at the Atlantic

[6:01] summit, all of the leaders spoke to a

[6:04] future for Iraq that will be brighter if

[6:06] it comes to the use of military force,

[6:09] where this dictator will no longer be

[6:11] able to oppress his own people, no

[6:13] longer able to threaten his neighbors,

[6:15] and no longer able to develop these

[6:17] horrible weapons which could be used

[6:20] against his neighbors as they have been

[6:22] used in the past or of greater concern

[6:24] to us. can spread and be acquired by

[6:27] terrorist organizations which might use

[6:30] them against us, our friends or our

[6:32] interest. I think it was also important

[6:34] to note in the president's statement

[6:35] yesterday his commitment to the UN and

[6:37] the role that we believe the UN will

[6:39] play uh in the aftermath of any conflict

[6:42] uh should it come and our continued

[6:44] support for the UN. With that, I'll take

[6:47] a couple of questions.

[6:48] >> Secretary, on on the allies, back in

[6:50] November, when several of them tried to

[6:53] dilute the resolution and they did

[6:55] accomplish some word changes, um would

[6:58] it be fair to say that they understood

[7:00] at the end that force was possible

[7:04] because they're impress they seem to

[7:06] give the impression they had succeeded

[7:08] in sidetracking force. And could you say

[7:11] if you think there'll be permanent

[7:12] damage to the alliance with what the

[7:15] French have done with support from

[7:17] Germany and Russia?

[7:18] >> On your first question, Barry, uh there

[7:20] can be no confusion on this point. If

[7:22] you remember the debate that we were

[7:24] having before 1441 was passed. There

[7:27] were some nations who insisted that a

[7:29] second resolution would be required and

[7:32] we insisted that a second resolution

[7:34] would not be required. And as we

[7:37] negotiated our way through that, we made

[7:38] it absolutely clear that we did not

[7:41] believe that the resolution as it

[7:43] finally passed would require a second

[7:45] resolution. And in fact, the resolution

[7:47] that we are not taking to a vote today

[7:50] is not a resolution that we uh believed

[7:52] was necessary. It was a resolution we

[7:54] were supporting along with the United

[7:56] Kingdom who tabled it and Spain. It was

[7:58] a resolution that would help some of our

[8:00] friends to show to their publics and to

[8:03] the world that we had taken uh one last

[8:06] step. We had made one last effort to see

[8:08] if Sodom Hussein would come into

[8:10] compliance. The burden of this problem

[8:14] rests squarely on Sodom Hussein and his

[8:17] continuing efforts to deceive, to deny,

[8:21] to do everything to divide the council,

[8:23] to take advantage of every meeting we

[8:25] have had over the last several months to

[8:27] do something just before that meeting to

[8:29] suggest that he is complying when he

[8:31] really isn't. And the world should know

[8:33] that uh this crisis is before us because

[8:35] of this regime and it flagrant violation

[8:39] of obligations that it entered into over

[8:41] the last 12 years. That's where the

[8:43] burden lies.

[8:44] >> And the is there permanent damage to the

[8:46] excuse

[8:47] >> uh is there permanent damage to uh to

[8:49] the the alliance? I the UN uh is an

[8:53] important institution

[8:55] um and it will survive and the United

[8:57] States will continue to be uh an

[9:00] important member of the United Nations

[9:02] and its various uh uh organizations. But

[9:06] clearly this is a test in my judgment

[9:08] that the security council did not meet.

[9:10] We all knew what we were doing last

[9:12] fall. The very reason that we went into

[9:15] a went into a prolonged negotiation on

[9:18] 1441 was so that it did not become the

[9:21] same kind of resolution that we had seen

[9:24] so many times in the past that had a lot

[9:26] of words, a lot of rhetoric and Sodom

[9:28] Hussein can simply ignore and thumb his

[9:30] nose at. This was a resolution that

[9:32] every person who voted for it, every

[9:35] permanent representative who was there

[9:37] on the 8th of November and voted for

[9:39] this resolution knew that it was

[9:41] different. that serious consequences

[9:43] would flow and those serious

[9:44] consequences meant the use of force to

[9:47] disarm Sodom Hussein if he did not

[9:49] comply with that resolution and

[9:52] cooperate fully with the inspectors to

[9:54] disarm that regime.

[9:56] >> Mr. Secretary, how how long a period of

[9:57] time do you think is appropriate for

[9:59] Saddam Hussein to be allowed to get out

[10:02] and who uh who else besides him would

[10:05] have to leave if uh if if they want to

[10:08] avert war?

[10:09] >> Um I I won't speak to a time limit. The

[10:11] president may may do that in his speech

[10:13] this evening and I'll leave that to him.

[10:16] But clearly we would want to see Saddam

[10:19] Hussein depart as well as immediate

[10:21] members of his family who are in

[10:22] positions of control and authority over

[10:25] the armed forces of Iraq. And there are

[10:27] a number of other individuals who would

[10:29] also like to see depart. Some of them

[10:31] were mentioned in in the weekend press,

[10:34] but it's not just one individual I think

[10:36] to solve the problem.

[10:37] >> Do you have a number though? Is there

[10:38] >> um I don't have a number at hand. There

[10:40] are variety of of numbers and ideas

[10:43] floating around and if somebody uh in

[10:45] Baghdad wishes to know the names, I'm

[10:46] sure we'd be able to provide them.

[10:49] >> Mr. Secretary, can you give us some

[10:51] insight what has happened over the last

[10:53] 24 hours since the meeting in the Azors?

[10:56] Who were the problems? What kind of

[10:58] conversations did you have? Who did you

[10:59] reach out to? What were the responses?

[11:02] Um the United Kingdom obviously reached

[11:06] out to a number of their um colleagues

[11:09] um and um I I can't speak for them. I'll

[11:12] let them cover their own calls and

[11:14] consultations. Similarly, Spain and and

[11:17] others. Uh Richard will give you the

[11:20] list of my calls uh for this morning,

[11:22] but it's about uh oh 12 or 15. I've

[11:25] spoken to the French. Just spoke to

[11:27] foreign minister Dilpan. I spoke to

[11:30] foreign minister Yoshka Fischer of

[11:31] Germany. I've spoken to foreign minister

[11:34] Igor Ianov of the Russian Federation.

[11:36] I've spoken to the new Chinese foreign

[11:38] minister, Foreign Minister Lee. Um I've

[11:41] spoken to President Misharf. I have

[11:44] spoken to Kofi Anan. Um I have spoken to

[11:47] uh foreign minister George Papandreo of

[11:49] Greece who's also in the Greek

[11:51] presidency for this period. I've spoken

[11:54] to Foreign Secretary Straw. Uh I've

[11:56] spoken to foreign minister Palacios of

[11:58] Spain and uh there's a very long list

[12:02] waiting when I get back upstairs. The

[12:04] response was um you know this this is

[12:08] where we are. Does anybody see any

[12:09] prospects for movement on this

[12:11] particular resolution? And uh frankly

[12:14] everybody pretty much accepted that this

[12:16] resolution was uh not going to be a

[12:20] successful one because there was one

[12:22] nation France that had indicated that it

[12:24] would veto it under any set any set of

[12:27] circumstances or any similar resolution

[12:29] is modified

[12:31] uh that would leave a path open to

[12:34] conflict. But we always knew from the

[12:36] very beginning that such a path had to

[12:39] be kept open. And this is what serious

[12:42] consequences meant. And without that

[12:43] path, Saddam Hussein would never comply.

[12:46] And what he was trying to do is just

[12:48] stretch it out. More inspections, more

[12:50] time. Let's delay. Let's let's give a

[12:52] little here, give a little there. Let's

[12:54] see if we can break this consensus. And

[12:57] um with the certainty of a French veto

[13:01] and possibly other vetos, uh this was

[13:04] not the time to have further division

[13:06] within the council by taking this to a

[13:08] vote.

[13:09] >> I've got one more. Let me excuse me.

[13:11] Excuse me. Yeah,

[13:12] >> Mr. Secretary, you seem to imply

[13:13] yesterday in one of the shows that you

[13:14] believe French commercial interests

[13:16] would help drive the position. I'm

[13:17] wondering if you can elaborate on that.

[13:18] And how firm a guarantee do we have that

[13:20] Turkey won't send its troops well into

[13:22] northern Iraq and cause problems with

[13:24] the the Kurds there? I I made the point

[13:27] that they're in response to the question

[13:28] that of course they're their commercial

[13:30] interest that everybody has to uh

[13:33] consider. Um and the French have uh for

[13:38] years had difficulties with the

[13:40] inspection regime. And I pointed out in

[13:42] one of the shows yesterday that when you

[13:44] go back to 19 98 and 19 early 1999 when

[13:50] the current inspection regime was being

[13:52] developed when UNMOIC was being created

[13:54] after the collapse of the previous

[13:57] inspection regime, uh France worked

[13:59] actively for a number of months and our

[14:01] judgment to uh try to weaken that

[14:05] inspection regime. uh and at the end of

[14:08] the day when compromises had been made

[14:10] and everybody thought we had a a good

[14:12] outcome before our time, the previous

[14:14] administration, even then France

[14:17] abstained from voting for it. And so uh

[14:20] um that is of concern to us. But in

[14:24] 1441, France was solidly in board. And

[14:27] when you look at the statements that

[14:28] were made by French officials right

[14:30] after the passage of 1441, it was

[14:33] absolutely clear that they understood

[14:35] that

[14:37] Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi regime had

[14:39] weapons of mass destruction. It's not

[14:41] something just known to American

[14:42] intelligence. It's known to all of the

[14:44] major intelligence agencies uh in the

[14:46] world. And France acknowledged that.

[14:48] Everybody acknowledged that when they

[14:50] signed on to 1441 because that's what it

[14:52] says. It's in Iraq is in material

[14:54] breach. Has been in material breach. and

[14:56] now has the opportunity to either get

[14:57] out of the problem or get into further

[14:59] material breach. What they did was get

[15:01] into further material breach and that's

[15:03] our judgment and we believe that the

[15:05] test of the resolution has been met with

[15:07] respect to uh uh the appropriateness of

[15:10] application of serious consequences

[15:12] >> and the Turks and the Kurds.

[15:13] >> Barbara, I'm I'm sorry on on the Turks

[15:16] and the situation in northern Iraq. We

[15:19] are in the closest consultation with the

[15:21] Turks and uh uh let me say that we are

[15:24] very sensitive to Turkish concerns. Uh

[15:27] we appreciate the fact that uh the

[15:29] Turkish government did take our request

[15:32] for uh deployments into their parliament

[15:36] uh at a difficult time for them with a

[15:38] prime minister who was still uh coming

[15:41] in so to speak. Mr. Erdogan was not the

[15:44] prime minister at that time and we are

[15:46] in the closest touch with them now on on

[15:48] a number of issues. one uh the

[15:50] possibility of resubmission and he he is

[15:53] committed to do that at a time that he

[15:54] believes is appropriate and secondly we

[15:56] don't think it would be useful right now

[15:58] to create any additional tension on the

[16:01] border between uh Turkey and northern

[16:04] Iraq and we are in discussions with them

[16:06] as to how to uh make sure that tensions

[16:09] can be kept at the lowest point and not

[16:12] to have difficulty in northern Iraq of

[16:15] the kind that concerns them. And we have

[16:17] also uh assured the Turks that in

[16:20] anything that the future might hold, we

[16:22] are committed to the territorial

[16:25] integrity of Iraq.

[16:28] >> I wanted to ask I wanted to ask uh just

[16:30] some personal reflections. Uh after 1441

[16:32] was passed, you were very very happy man

[16:35] and uh uh certainly it was quite a

[16:38] triumph. Um how have you been feeling

[16:40] the last few weeks? When did you realize

[16:42] that this was not going to happen? Do

[16:44] you wish you'd done anything

[16:45] differently? Do you wish you'd traveled

[16:46] more, changed your tactics in any way?

[16:49] >> This this uh this legend that is out

[16:52] there now that Colon Pal one he the

[16:54] first v variation of it was he doesn't

[16:57] travel and the next variation was he he

[16:59] hates to travel and the third variation

[17:01] was uh he will never travel and doesn't

[17:04] want to travel. um you you do your job

[17:08] by personal contact, by contact, by

[17:11] travel, and by the use of modern

[17:14] technology so that uh you can get more

[17:17] bang for the time. And so, um, in the

[17:20] last 6 weeks, I have had, uh, four

[17:25] personal one-on-one meetings, direct

[17:27] meetings with the French foreign

[17:29] minister, with the British foreign

[17:32] minister,

[17:34] uh, with the Russian foreign minister,

[17:36] five such meetings with the Chinese

[17:38] foreign minister. I have gone to Davos

[17:42] in Switzerland where I addressed an

[17:43] international

[17:45] uh setting and at that meeting I met

[17:47] with the Turkish prime minister for

[17:50] almost two hours and the incoming

[17:52] Turkish prime minister Mr. Erdogan, I

[17:55] have had the Turkish a Turkish

[17:56] delegation here in the department, a

[17:58] full delegation, the foreign minister,

[18:00] the uh finance minister and they came to

[18:03] my home till midnight as we worked on

[18:05] the economic package. And so I uh

[18:08] believe that I have used my time

[18:10] properly. Uh at the same time, I went to

[18:12] Asia a few weeks ago. So I travel when I

[18:15] believe travel is appropriate. I'd like

[18:17] to travel more but you know the

[18:19] secretary of state has many

[18:20] responsibilities that he or she has to

[18:23] has to deal with and one has to balance

[18:25] it all but I assure you that I do not uh

[18:29] shrink back from traveling and I will be

[18:31] traveling again soon.

[18:32] >> But any regrets anything you would have

[18:33] done differently?

[18:35] I mean what you can always look and say

[18:39] you should have done this should have

[18:40] done that but the fact of the matter is

[18:42] we came up with a good resolution and we

[18:45] got a solid vote for it 15 to zero and

[18:49] then for a period of 4 months after that

[18:52] we worked hard with the inspectors we

[18:54] provided them intelligence the focus

[18:56] really was at the UN in New York not you

[18:59] know a lot of other places that's where

[19:00] we had to concentrate our effort and we

[19:02] did everything we could to try to

[19:06] persuade the council that what they were

[19:08] seeing was not compliance. What they

[19:10] were seeing was passive cooperation that

[19:12] didn't get to the heart of the matter

[19:14] which was a strategic decision by Sodom

[19:16] Hussein to comply.

[19:19] And that's what we weren't able to get

[19:21] and that's what uh we weren't able to

[19:23] convince some members of the council uh

[19:26] is what was needed uh in order for us to

[19:29] believe uh that Saddam Hussein was a

[19:33] changed regime who was leading a changed

[19:36] regime uh that was willing now to

[19:38] cooperate with the international

[19:40] community and comply with its

[19:41] obligations. One last one. Sorry.

[19:43] >> Mr. Secretary, you said that the

[19:45] ultimatum would be for Saddam Hussein to

[19:47] leave Iraq. Is there any form of

[19:49] disarmament or cooperation at this stage

[19:51] which could uh save his skin?

[19:54] >> I think the the time for diplomacy uh

[19:57] has passed. Um I think that's pretty

[20:00] clear uh that's what the leaders were

[20:03] saying in the Azors yesterday. Um and um

[20:07] we

[20:09] used last evening and uh this morning to

[20:12] consult broadly around the world. We

[20:15] did, the British did, the Spanish did.

[20:18] Um, a lot of people have been talking to

[20:20] each other this morning and over the

[20:21] overnight and it became clear that uh uh

[20:25] it would be best at this time to

[20:26] withdraw the resolution and I can think

[20:28] of nothing uh that Saddam Hussein could

[20:31] do diplomatically. I think that that

[20:33] time is now over. He had his chance.

[20:35] He's had many chances over the last 12

[20:37] years and he has blown every one of

[20:39] those chances. Thank you.

[20:41] >> Thank you. Secretary of State Coen

[20:43] Powell telling Saddam Hussein that the

[20:46] time is for diplomacy is over. As he put

[20:48] it, the window on diplomacy has closed.

[20:50] The moment of truth is arriving.

[20:52] Secretary of State Pal commenting on the

[20:54] two key developments this morning. The

[20:56] first that the United States, Spain, and

[20:57] Britain have abandoned their calls for a

[20:59] vote in the UN Security Council to try

[21:01] to force Iraq to disarm immediately. Uh

[21:05] Secretary Powell acknowledged they

[21:06] didn't have the votes. He blamed France

[21:08] for its contention that it would veto

[21:10] any action. He said this is a test that

[21:12] the security council did not meet. The

[21:14] second key development this morning is

[21:16] that President Bush will address the

[21:17] nation this evening at 8:00 p.m. Powell

[21:20] says you can expect to hear the

[21:21] president say tonight that the only way

[21:23] for Saddam Hussein to avoid war is by

[21:25] leaving Iraq with his family and his co

[21:28] cohorts. He said the president may put a

[21:30] deadline on this. A reminder, President

[21:32] Bush addressing the nation at 8:00 p.m.

[21:33] Eastern time tonight. Events in this

[21:35] crisis are moving fast. Please stay with

[21:37] CBS News and more on the CBS Evening

[21:39] News with Dan Rather tonight. For now,

[21:41] I'm Anthony Mason at CBS News in New

[21:43] York. Good day.

[21:46] For news 24 hours a day, go to CBS