NBC News Special Report - 2003-03-17 - 10:46 a.m. (E)
Channel: malgent
Transcript
Language: English (original, YouTube automatic captions)
[0:00] onto his son Martin who in turn passed
[0:02] it on to
[0:05] >> this is an NBC News special report. Here
[0:09] is Tom Brokoff.
[0:12] >> Good morning everyone. As you may be
[0:14] aware, the march to war with Iraq is now
[0:16] picking up pace. The diplomatic option
[0:18] has been exhausted at the United
[0:20] Nations. uh John Nagraati who is the
[0:23] United States ambassador to the UN
[0:25] announced within the hour that they're
[0:27] abandoning any hope of getting a second
[0:29] UN resolution because members have made
[0:32] it clear that they will veto that
[0:33] specifically that would be France or
[0:36] Russia of raising the threat of a veto
[0:38] given the timeline that the president
[0:40] and prime minister Tony Blair of Great
[0:42] Britain worked out in their summit
[0:44] meeting in the Azors last night. We are
[0:46] now awaiting the appearance of Secretary
[0:48] of State Coen Powell, who will describe
[0:50] where we go from here. The president is
[0:52] scheduled to address the nation tonight
[0:54] at 8 Eastern time. The troops in the
[0:57] Persian Gulf uh are leaning forward and
[1:00] they have been told that there could be
[1:02] war as early as this weekend on the
[1:05] ground. Let's go now to the Secretary of
[1:07] State.
[1:07] >> Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. As
[1:09] you know know last fall in an act of
[1:12] unonymity the security council came
[1:14] together following President Bush's
[1:17] historic speech to the United Nations on
[1:19] the 12th of September and on the 8th of
[1:20] November after long negotiations uh
[1:24] passed UN resolution 1441
[1:28] by unanimous vote 15 to zero. Not one
[1:31] member failing to raise a hand in
[1:33] support of that resolution.
[1:36] In the months after the passage of UN
[1:38] resolution 1441,
[1:40] we watched as the inspectors began their
[1:43] work and we were immediately concerned
[1:46] that Iraq was not going to understand
[1:48] the intention of 1441 when Iraq
[1:51] submitted 30 days later a declaration
[1:54] that can only be said to be false, not
[1:56] complete, rather incomplete, not
[1:59] truthful, untruthful, and nowhere near
[2:02] meeting the spirit intended
[2:04] in 1441.
[2:07] We call that out to the international
[2:09] community at that time. We said we
[2:12] believe that that false declaration was
[2:13] a material breach. We continued to
[2:16] support the inspectors. We continued to
[2:18] watch and although we have seen some
[2:21] process improvements and some grudging
[2:24] movement on the part of Sodom Hussein's
[2:26] regime to provide some information and
[2:29] provide some equipment to the
[2:31] inspectors. It certainly wasn't the kind
[2:34] of compliance and total cooperation that
[2:37] 1441 required and that we were hoping
[2:41] but had no illusions about Iraq being
[2:44] able to accept and respond to. As a
[2:48] result of this and as a result of a
[2:50] number of briefings that we received
[2:51] from UNMovic and IAEA
[2:54] uh a week and a half ago, the United
[2:56] Kingdom, the United States, and uh Spain
[3:00] uh put forward a resolution that would
[3:03] once again give Sodom Hussein one last
[3:06] chance to act or face the serious
[3:08] consequences that were authorized and
[3:10] clearly intended in UN resolution 1441.
[3:14] Unfortunately, over the last u roughly
[3:17] uh two weeks or thereabouts, a little
[3:19] less than two weeks that we have
[3:20] debating this particular draft
[3:22] resolution and despite best efforts to
[3:25] see whether or not language could be
[3:26] adjusted uh to make it more acceptable
[3:29] to council members, it is clear that
[3:32] there are some permanent members of the
[3:33] council that would veto any such
[3:35] resolution or any resolution resembling
[3:38] the one that the British tabled Friday
[3:40] before last at the United Nations. As a
[3:43] result of this, uh, the United Kingdom,
[3:45] the United States, and Spain decided to
[3:49] not call for a vote on this resolution.
[3:52] Um we spent a great deal of time
[3:54] overnight uh and earlier this morning
[3:57] talking to friends and colleagues around
[4:00] the world about uh the resolution and it
[4:03] was our judgment reached by the United
[4:06] States, the United Kingdom and Spain
[4:08] that no further purpose would be served
[4:10] by pushing this resolution. So we are
[4:13] not going to ask for a vote on the
[4:14] resolution. the resolution uh will uh
[4:17] die anyway because it had a built-in
[4:20] date of 17 March within the resolution
[4:23] which has not been modified. As you
[4:26] heard the president and the other
[4:28] leaders who assembled in the Azors
[4:31] yesterday for the Atlantic summit say
[4:33] the window on diplomacy is uh closing.
[4:37] Uh the moment of truth is arriving and
[4:40] you will hear a speech from the
[4:41] president thei of the United States this
[4:43] evening. President Bush will address the
[4:45] nation and the world on the situation as
[4:47] we now see it. Um in his speech, he
[4:50] clearly will issue an ultimatum to Sodom
[4:53] Hussein that the only way to avoid the
[4:55] serious consequences that were built
[4:58] into 1441 is for Sodom Hussein and his
[5:02] immediate cohort uh to leave the country
[5:05] and to allow uh this matter to be
[5:08] resolved through the peaceful entry of
[5:10] force and not a conflict. Nevertheless,
[5:12] U. the president's determination. We
[5:14] made clear tonight that this matter
[5:16] cannot continue indefinitely that Sodom
[5:18] Hussein is guilty of the charges that
[5:22] have been brought against him previously
[5:24] through these many resolutions which
[5:26] acknowledged that he had weapons of mass
[5:28] destruction and he has failed to disarm
[5:31] himself as required by the various
[5:33] resolutions. We believe and I think um
[5:37] you've also heard an opinion from uh
[5:39] British legal authorities within the
[5:41] last 24 hours that there is sufficient
[5:44] authority in 1441 678 and 687 earlier
[5:50] resolutions for whatever military action
[5:52] might be required. I'm very very pleased
[5:55] that the council did come together last
[5:57] November 8th for 1441. of course
[6:00] disappointed that we were unable to get
[6:02] a subsequent resolution but we believe
[6:04] that our actions now are uh supported by
[6:09] international law whatever actions we
[6:11] might take in the future and the
[6:13] president will talk to this issue
[6:15] tonight. I won't say any more about the
[6:16] president's speech because the president
[6:18] of course will have the opportunity to
[6:20] speak for himself and uh make the points
[6:23] perfectly clear to the American people
[6:25] and to the international community.
[6:26] You'll also notice that in their
[6:29] statements yesterday at the Atlantic
[6:31] summit, all of the leaders spoke to a
[6:35] future for Iraq that will be brighter if
[6:37] it comes to the use of military force,
[6:40] where this dictator will no longer be
[6:42] able to oppress his own people, no
[6:43] longer able to threaten his neighbors,
[6:46] and no longer able to develop these
[6:48] horrible weapons which could be used
[6:51] against his neighbors as they have been
[6:52] used in the past or of greater concern
[6:55] to us. can spread and be acquired by
[6:58] terrorist organizations which might use
[7:00] them against us, our friends or our
[7:02] interest. I think it was also important
[7:04] to note in the president's statement
[7:06] yesterday his commitment to the UN and
[7:08] the role that we believe the UN will
[7:10] play uh in the aftermath of any conflict
[7:13] uh should it come and our continued
[7:15] support for the UN. With that, I'll take
[7:18] a couple of questions.
[7:19] >> Secretary, on on the allies, back in
[7:21] November, when several of them tried to
[7:24] dilute the resolution and they did
[7:26] accomplish some word changes, um would
[7:28] it be fair to say that they understood
[7:31] at the end that force was possible?
[7:35] Because they're impress they seem to
[7:37] give the impression they had succeeded
[7:39] in sidetracking force. And could you say
[7:42] if you think there'll be permanent
[7:43] damage to the alliance with what the
[7:46] French have done with support from
[7:48] Germany and Russia?
[7:48] >> On your first question, Barry, uh there
[7:51] can be no confusion on this point. If
[7:53] you remember the debate that we were
[7:55] having before 1441 was passed. There
[7:57] were some nations who insisted that a
[8:00] second resolution would be required and
[8:03] we insisted that a second resolution
[8:05] would not be required. And as we
[8:07] negotiated our way through that, we made
[8:09] it absolutely clear that we did not
[8:12] believe that the resolution as it
[8:14] finally passed would require a second
[8:16] resolution. And in fact, the resolution
[8:18] that we are not taking to a vote today
[8:20] is not a resolution that we uh believed
[8:23] was necessary. It was a resolution we
[8:25] were supporting along with the United
[8:27] Kingdom who tabled it and Spain. It was
[8:29] a resolution that would help some of our
[8:31] friends to show to their publics and to
[8:33] the world that we had taken uh one last
[8:37] step. We had made one last effort to see
[8:39] if Sodom Hussein would come into
[8:41] compliance. The burden of this problem
[8:44] rests squarely on Sodom Hussein and his
[8:48] continuing efforts to deceive, to deny,
[8:52] to do everything to divide the council,
[8:54] to take advantage of every meeting we
[8:56] have had over the last several months to
[8:58] do something just before that meeting to
[8:59] suggest that he is complying when he
[9:01] really isn't. And the world should know
[9:03] that uh this crisis is before us because
[9:06] of this regime and its flagrant
[9:09] violation of obligations that it entered
[9:11] into over the last 12 years. That's
[9:13] where the burden lies.
[9:15] >> And the is there permanent damage to the
[9:17] excuse me
[9:18] >> uh is there permanent damage to uh to
[9:20] the the alliance? I the UN uh is an
[9:23] important institution
[9:25] um and it will survive and the United
[9:28] States will continue to be uh an
[9:31] important member of the United Nations
[9:33] and its various uh uh organizations. But
[9:37] clearly this is a test in my judgment
[9:39] that the security council did not meet.
[9:41] We all knew what we were doing last
[9:42] fall. The very reason that we went into
[9:46] a went into a prolonged negotiation on
[9:48] 1441 was so that it did not become the
[9:52] same kind of resolution that we had seen
[9:55] so many times in the past that had a lot
[9:56] of words, a lot of rhetoric and Sodom
[9:59] Hussein can simply ignore and thumb his
[10:01] nose at. This was a resolution that
[10:03] every person who voted for it, every
[10:06] permanent representative who was there
[10:08] on the 8th of November and voted for
[10:10] this resolution knew that it was
[10:12] different. that serious consequences
[10:14] would flow and those serious
[10:15] consequences meant the use of force to
[10:18] disarm Sodom Hussein if he did not
[10:20] comply with that resolution and
[10:22] cooperate fully with the inspectors to
[10:24] disarm that regime.
[10:26] >> Mr. Secretary, how how long a period of
[10:28] time do you think is appropriate for
[10:30] Saddam Hussein to be allowed to get out?
[10:32] And who uh who else besides him would
[10:36] have to leave if uh if if they want to
[10:39] avert war?
[10:40] >> Um I I won't speak to a time limit. The
[10:42] president may may do that in his speech
[10:44] this evening and I'll leave that to him.
[10:46] But clearly we would want to see Saddam
[10:50] Hussein depart as well as immediate
[10:52] members of his family who are in
[10:53] positions of control and authority over
[10:56] the armed forces of Iraq. And there are
[10:58] a number of other individuals who would
[11:00] also like to see depart. Some of them
[11:02] were mentioned in in the weekend press,
[11:05] but it's not just one individual I think
[11:07] to solve the problem.
[11:08] >> Do you have a number though? Is there
[11:09] >> um I don't have a number at hand. There
[11:11] are variety of of numbers and ideas
[11:14] floating around and if somebody uh in
[11:16] Baghdad wishes to know the names I'm
[11:17] sure we'd be able to provide them.
[11:19] Secretary
[11:20] >> Mr. Secretary can you give us some
[11:22] insight what has happened over the last
[11:24] 24 hours since the meeting in the Azors?
[11:27] Who were the problems? What kind of
[11:29] conversations did you have? Who did you
[11:30] reach out to? What were the responses?
[11:33] Um the United Kingdom obviously uh
[11:36] reached out to a number of their um
[11:39] colleagues um and um I I can't speak for
[11:42] them. I'll let them cover their own
[11:44] calls and consultations. Similarly,
[11:47] Spain and and others. Uh Richard will
[11:50] give you the list of my calls uh for
[11:52] this morning, but it's about uh oh 12 or
[11:55] 15. I've spoken to the French. Just
[11:57] spoke to foreign minister Dilpan. I
[12:00] spoke to Foreign Minister Yoshka Fischer
[12:02] of Germany. I've spoken to Foreign
[12:04] Minister Igor even of the Russian
[12:07] Federation. I've spoken to the new
[12:08] Chinese foreign minister, Foreign
[12:10] Minister Lee. Um I've spoken to
[12:13] President Masharov. I have spoken to
[12:15] Kofi Anan. Um I have spoken to uh
[12:18] foreign minister George Papandreo of
[12:20] Greece who's also in the Greek
[12:22] presidency for this period. I've spoken
[12:25] to his foreign secretary straw. Uh I
[12:27] spoken to foreign minister Palasios of
[12:29] Spain and uh there's a very long list
[12:33] waiting when I get back upstairs. The
[12:34] response was um you know this this is
[12:38] where we are. Does anybody see any
[12:40] prospects for movement on this
[12:42] particular resolution? And uh frankly
[12:45] everybody pretty much accepted that this
[12:47] resolution was uh not going to be a
[12:50] successful one because there was one
[12:53] nation France that had indicated that it
[12:55] would veto it under any set any set of
[12:58] circumstances or any similar resolution
[13:00] is modified uh that would leave a path
[13:04] open to conflict. But we always knew
[13:07] from the very beginning that such a path
[13:09] had to be kept open. And this is what
[13:12] serious consequences meant. And without
[13:14] that path, Saddam Hussein would never
[13:16] comply. And what he was trying to do was
[13:19] just stretch it out. More inspections,
[13:20] more time. Let's delay. Let's let's give
[13:23] a little here, give a little there.
[13:24] Let's see if we can break this
[13:26] consensus. And um with the certainty of
[13:30] a French veto and possibly other vetos,
[13:34] uh this was not the time to have further
[13:36] division within the council by taking
[13:38] this to a vote.
[13:40] >> I've got one. Let me Excuse me. Excuse
[13:42] me. Yeah,
[13:42] >> Mr. Secretary, you seem to imply
[13:44] yesterday on one of the shows that you
[13:45] believe French commercial interests
[13:47] would help drive the position. I'm
[13:48] wondering if you can elaborate on that.
[13:49] And how firm a guarantee do we have that
[13:51] Turkey won't send its troops well into
[13:52] northern Iraq and cause problems with
[13:54] the the Kurds there? I I made the point
[13:58] that they're in response to a question
[13:59] that of course they're their commercial
[14:01] interest that everybody has to uh
[14:03] consider. Um and the French have uh for
[14:09] years had difficulties with the
[14:11] inspection regime. And I pointed out in
[14:13] one of the shows yesterday that when you
[14:15] go back to 19 98 and 19 early 1999 when
[14:21] the current inspection regime was being
[14:23] developed when UNMOIC was being created
[14:25] after the collapse of the previous
[14:27] inspection regime, uh France worked
[14:30] actively for a number of months and our
[14:32] judgment to uh try to weaken that
[14:36] inspection regime. uh and at the end of
[14:39] the day when compromises had been made
[14:41] and everybody thought we had a a good
[14:43] outcome before our time previous
[14:45] administration even then France
[14:47] abstained from voting for it and so uh
[14:51] um that is of concern to us but in 1441
[14:56] France was solidly in board and when you
[14:58] look at the statements that were made by
[15:00] French officials right after the passage
[15:02] of 1441 it was absolutely clear that
[15:05] they understood that Saddam Hussein and
[15:08] the Iraqi regime had weapons of mass
[15:10] destruction. It's not something just
[15:12] known to American intelligence. It's
[15:14] known to all of the major intelligence
[15:16] agencies uh in the world. And France
[15:19] acknowledged that. Everybody
[15:20] acknowledged that when they signed on to
[15:21] 1441 because that's what it says. It's
[15:23] in Iraq is in material breach, has been
[15:25] in material breach and now has the
[15:27] opportunity to either get out of the
[15:29] problem or get into further material
[15:30] breach. And what they did was get into
[15:32] further material breach. And that's our
[15:34] judgment. And we believe that the test
[15:36] of the resolution has been met with
[15:38] respect to uh uh the appropriateness of
[15:41] application of serious consequences
[15:42] >> and the Turks and the Kurds.
[15:43] >> Barbara, I'm I'm sorry on on the Turks
[15:47] and the situation in northern Iraq. We
[15:50] are in the closest consultation with the
[15:52] Turks and uh uh let me say that we are
[15:55] very sensitive to Turkish concerns. We
[15:58] appreciate the fact that uh the Turkish
[16:01] government did take our request for uh
[16:05] deployments into their parliament uh at
[16:07] a difficult time for them with a prime
[16:09] minister who is still uh coming in so to
[16:13] speak. Mr. Erdogan was not the prime
[16:14] minister at that time and we are in the
[16:17] closest touch with them now on on a
[16:19] number of issues. one uh the possibility
[16:22] of resubmission and he he is committed
[16:24] to do that at a time that he believes is
[16:26] appropriate and secondly we don't think
[16:28] it would be useful right now to create
[16:30] any additional tension on the border
[16:32] between uh Turkey and northern Iraq and
[16:35] we are in discussions with them as to
[16:37] how to uh make sure that tensions can be
[16:41] kept at the lowest point and not to have
[16:44] difficulty in northern Iraq of the kind
[16:46] that concerns them. And we have also uh
[16:49] assured the Turks that in anything that
[16:51] the future might hold, we are committed
[16:54] to the territorial integrity of Iraq.
[16:58] >> I wanted to ask I wanted to ask uh just
[17:01] some personal reflections. Uh after 1441
[17:03] was passed, you were very very happy man
[17:06] and uh uh certainly it was quite a
[17:09] triumph. Um how have you been feeling
[17:11] the last few weeks? When did you realize
[17:13] that this was not going to happen? Do
[17:15] you wish you'd done anything
[17:16] differently? Do you wish you'd traveled
[17:17] more, changed your tactics in any way?
[17:20] >> This this uh this legend that is out
[17:23] there now that Coen Pal one he the first
[17:25] v variation of it was he doesn't travel
[17:28] and the next variation was he he hates
[17:30] to travel and the third variation was uh
[17:33] he will never travel and doesn't want to
[17:35] travel. um you you do your job by
[17:40] personal contact, by contact, by travel
[17:43] and by the use of modern technology so
[17:45] that uh you can get more bang for the
[17:49] time. And so, um, in the last 6 weeks, I
[17:53] have had, uh, four personal one-on-one
[17:57] meetings, direct meetings with the
[17:59] French foreign minister, with the
[18:02] British foreign minister,
[18:04] uh, with the Russian foreign minister,
[18:07] five such meetings with the Chinese
[18:09] foreign minister. I have gone to Davos
[18:12] in Switzerland where I addressed an
[18:14] international
[18:16] uh setting and at that meeting I met
[18:18] with the Turkish prime minister for
[18:20] almost two hours and the incoming
[18:23] Turkish prime minister Mr. Erdogan, I
[18:26] have had the Turkish a Turkish
[18:27] delegation here in the department, a
[18:29] full delegation, the foreign minister,
[18:31] the uh finance minister and they came to
[18:34] my home till midnight as we worked on
[18:36] the economic package. And so I uh
[18:39] believe that I have used my time
[18:41] properly. Uh at the same time, I went to
[18:43] Asia a few weeks ago. So I travel when I
[18:46] believe travel is appropriate. I'd like
[18:48] to travel more but you know the
[18:50] secretary of state has many
[18:51] responsibilities that he or she has to
[18:54] has to deal with and one has to balance
[18:55] it all but I assure you that I do not uh
[19:00] shrink back from traveling and I will be
[19:02] traveling again soon.
[19:03] >> Any regrets you would have done
[19:04] different?
[19:06] I mean what you can always look and say
[19:10] you should have done this should have
[19:11] done that but the fact of the matter is
[19:13] we came up with a good resolution and we
[19:16] got a solid vote for it 15 to zero and
[19:19] then for a period of four months after
[19:22] that we worked hard with the inspectors
[19:24] we provided them intelligence the focus
[19:27] really was at the UN in New York not you
[19:29] know a lot of other places that's where
[19:31] we had to concentrate our effort and we
[19:33] did everything we could to try to
[19:37] persuade the council that what they were
[19:39] seeing was not compliance. What they
[19:41] were seeing was passive cooperation that
[19:43] didn't get to the heart of the matter
[19:45] which was a strategic decision by Sodom
[19:47] Hussein to comply.
[19:50] And that's what we weren't able to get
[19:52] and that's what uh we weren't able to
[19:54] convince some members of the council uh
[19:56] is what was needed uh in order for us to
[20:00] believe uh that Sodom Hussein was a
[20:03] changed regime was leading a changed
[20:06] regime uh that was willing now to
[20:09] cooperate with the international
[20:11] community and comply with its
[20:12] obligations. One last one. Sorry.
[20:14] >> Mr. Secretary, you said that the
[20:16] ultimatum would be for Saddam Hussein to
[20:18] leave Iraq. Is there any form of
[20:20] disarmament or cooperation at this stage
[20:22] which could uh save his skin?
[20:25] >> I think the the time for diplomacy uh
[20:28] has passed. Um I think that's pretty
[20:31] clear. Uh that's what the leaders were
[20:34] saying in the Azors yesterday. Um and um
[20:38] we
[20:40] used last evening and uh this morning to
[20:43] consult broadly around the world. We
[20:45] did, the British did, the Spanish did.
[20:49] Um, a lot of people have been talking to
[20:50] each other this morning and over the
[20:52] overnight and it became clear that uh uh
[20:56] it would be best at this time to
[20:57] withdraw the resolution and I can think
[20:59] of nothing uh that Saddam Hussein could
[21:01] do diplomatically. I think that that
[21:03] time is now over. He had his chance.
[21:06] He's had many chances over the last 12
[21:08] years and he has blown every one of
[21:10] those chances. Thank you. Thank you.
[21:13] >> Secretary of State Coen Powell appearing
[21:16] shortly after the United Nations
[21:18] Security Council collapsed its
[21:20] diplomatic efforts when it was clear
[21:21] that the French would veto the
[21:23] resolution put forward by the United
[21:24] Kingdom. Let's go now quickly to NBC's
[21:26] chief foreign affairs correspondent
[21:27] Andrea Mitchell. The president will say
[21:29] tonight, Andrea, that Saddam Hussein has
[21:31] x number of hours to leave with members
[21:34] of his family and other top members of
[21:36] the BA Socialist Party there. What are
[21:38] the realistic hopes within the
[21:40] administration that in fact he'll go
[21:42] into exile?
[21:43] >> Intelligence officials have been working
[21:44] on this very hard, Tom. There is very
[21:46] little hope that he would take this exit
[21:48] and leave. And we should point out that
[21:51] even if he were to leave with his
[21:52] immediate family, there would still be
[21:54] military action because the US would
[21:57] still go in to clean out weapons of mass
[21:59] destruction and to root out the rest of
[22:01] the regime and the bath party. Tom
[22:03] >> and at the Pentagon, NBC, Jim Mlashsky.
[22:05] What about the oil fields, Jim?
[22:08] Well, Tom, there's new intelligence that
[22:10] indicates that Saddam Hussein is
[22:11] preparing to destroy his oil fields. Not
[22:14] only that he's probably rigged
[22:15] explosives to some of the oil wellheads,
[22:18] but that he may already be beginning be
[22:20] beginning to flood uh the deserts by
[22:23] opening up some of the oil spets and
[22:25] allowing the oil to flow free.
[22:27] >> All right. And General Barry McAffrey,
[22:29] who is an NBC News analyst, of course,
[22:31] served with distinction during the
[22:32] Persian Gulf War. General, what are your
[22:34] concerns if we were to go to war by the
[22:36] end of this week?
[22:38] >> Well, I don't think I have any real
[22:39] serious ones. I think the initial
[22:41] assault elements, Tom, are there uh to
[22:43] be able to go in and certainly crack all
[22:45] the forces south of the Euphrates and
[22:47] close up on Baghdad. They'll have this
[22:49] rolling start. They'll have to bring in
[22:51] second echelon troops, but there's a
[22:53] thousand aircraft, a thousand Tomahawk
[22:55] missiles, and 160,000 troops in place.
[22:59] >> And what about Miklo's report that he
[23:01] could flood the fields with oil? Uh I
[23:03] think all these tricks Saddam will try,
[23:06] many of his chain of command simply
[23:08] aren't going to follow instructions.
[23:10] There will also be a very uh
[23:12] extraordinary and daring special
[23:14] operations and electronic warfare
[23:17] campaign. And finally, they're going to
[23:19] take out the command and control in the
[23:20] first hour of the war. So it'll be a a
[23:24] huge amount of momentum to roll these
[23:27] people up in the first few days of
[23:29] combat. All right, thanks very much.
[23:30] General Barry McAffrey in the Kuwaiti
[23:32] desert now with the Third Infantry on
[23:34] the phone is NBC's David Bloom. David,
[23:37] is there a change in tenor there where
[23:39] you are?
[23:40] >> There is, Tom, and I'd set a couple of
[23:42] examples. First off, today for the first
[23:44] time, we've seen the A10 Warthogs, the
[23:47] Air Force's close air support planes
[23:50] flying missions above us here. We're
[23:52] about 30 m south of the Iraqi border. In
[23:55] addition to that, we've also seen the
[23:57] tanks and the Bradleys. There about 250
[23:59] tanks in the third infantry division up
[24:01] practicing on the Udari range with their
[24:04] live ammunition. The US military is also
[24:07] receiving reports that Iraq is moving to
[24:09] the south not only their artillery but
[24:11] also potentially chemical weapons. So
[24:12] they're certainly gearing up for that
[24:14] possibility. The troops here are going
[24:15] to be watching the president's speech
[24:17] about 4 a.m. local time and then they'll
[24:19] see what orders they get after that.
[24:20] Tom.
[24:21] >> All right. Thanks very much NBC David
[24:23] Bloom who is with the third infantry the
[24:25] mechanized division that will be one of
[24:26] the points on the spear should it come
[24:28] to war and it appears very likely now
[24:30] that could happen by the end of this
[24:32] week we'll hear from the president
[24:33] tonight at 8 we'll have complete details
[24:35] on NBC Nightly News continuing coverage
[24:37] throughout the day on MSNBC on cable and
[24:40] MSNBC.com
[24:41] I'm Tom Bro on New York I'll see you
[24:43] later
[24:50] luxurious wike waist length pair.
[24:51] >> Yes.