ABC News Special Report - 2003-03-17 - 10:46 a.m. (E)
Channel: malgent
Transcript
Language: English (original, YouTube automatic captions)
[0:00] a song from their new CD, Down the Old
[0:03] Plank Road. Here are the chieftains.
[0:21] This is an ABC News special report.
[0:26] >> Good morning everybody. I'm Peter
[0:27] Jennings at ABC News headquarters in New
[0:29] York. The president said it yesterday.
[0:30] This was the moment of truth visa v Iraq
[0:32] and in many ways it is. We interrupted
[0:34] this moment because the secretary of
[0:36] state Colon Powell is about to speak
[0:38] from the State Department and we'll get
[0:39] some greater sense than we had even an
[0:42] hour ago about the imminence of a US
[0:44] attack on Iraq. Already this morning,
[0:47] the US and Britain and Spain have said
[0:49] publicly that they will not propose a
[0:52] new resolution to the UN Security
[0:54] Council uh requesting authorization for
[0:56] force. The administration has said this
[0:58] is the fault of France which said it had
[1:00] a permanent veto and would use it but in
[1:02] fact the US probably didn't have the
[1:03] votes here fall in an act of unonyimity
[1:07] the security council came together
[1:09] following President Bush's historic
[1:12] speech to the United Nations on the 12th
[1:13] of September and on the 8th of November
[1:16] after long negotiations uh passed UN
[1:19] resolution 1441
[1:22] by unanimous vote 15 to zero not one
[1:25] member failing willing to raise a hand
[1:28] in support of that resolution.
[1:30] In the months after the passage of UN
[1:33] resolution 1441,
[1:35] we watched as the inspectors began their
[1:37] work and we were immediately concerned
[1:40] that Iraq was not going to understand
[1:43] the intention of 1441 when Iraq
[1:46] submitted 30 days later a declaration
[1:48] that can only be said to be false, not
[1:51] complete, rather incomplete, not
[1:53] truthful, untruthful, and nowhere near
[1:56] meeting the spirit intended
[1:59] in 1341.
[2:01] We call that out to the international
[2:04] community at that time. We said we
[2:06] believe that that false declaration was
[2:08] a material breach. We continued to
[2:11] support the inspectors. We continued to
[2:13] watch and although we have seen some
[2:16] process improvements and some grudging
[2:18] movement on the part of Sodom Hussein's
[2:21] regime to provide some information and
[2:24] provide some equipment to the
[2:26] inspectors. It certainly wasn't the kind
[2:29] of compliance and total cooperation that
[2:32] 1441 required and that we were hoping
[2:35] but had no illusions about Iraq being
[2:38] able to accept and respond to. As a
[2:42] result of this and as a result of a
[2:44] number of briefings that we received
[2:46] from UNMOVIC and IAEA
[2:49] uh a week and a half ago, the United
[2:51] Kingdom, the United States, and uh Spain
[2:55] uh put forward a resolution that would
[2:57] once again give Sodom Hussein one last
[3:00] chance to act or face the serious
[3:03] consequences that were authorized and
[3:05] clearly intended in UN resolution 1441.
[3:09] Unfortunately, over the last um roughly
[3:12] uh two weeks or thereabouts, a little
[3:13] less than two weeks that we have
[3:15] debating this particular draft
[3:16] resolution and despite best efforts to
[3:19] see whether or not language could be
[3:21] adjusted uh to make it more acceptable
[3:23] to council members, it is clear that
[3:26] there are some permanent members of the
[3:28] council that would veto any such
[3:30] resolution or any resolution resembling
[3:32] the one that the British tabled Friday
[3:34] before last at the United Nations. As a
[3:37] result of this, uh, the United Kingdom,
[3:40] the United States, and Spain decided to
[3:43] not call for a vote on this resolution.
[3:46] Um, we spent a great deal of time
[3:49] overnight uh and earlier this morning
[3:52] talking to friends and colleagues around
[3:54] the world about uh the resolution and it
[3:58] was our judgment reached by the United
[4:01] States, the United Kingdom and Spain
[4:03] that no further purpose would be served
[4:05] by pushing this resolution. So, we are
[4:07] not going to ask for a vote on the
[4:09] resolution. the resolution uh will uh
[4:12] die anyway because it had a built-in
[4:14] date of 17 March within the resolution
[4:17] which has not been modified. As you
[4:20] heard the president and the other
[4:23] leaders who assembled in the Azors
[4:25] yesterday for the Atlantic summit say
[4:27] the window on diplomacy is uh closing.
[4:31] Uh the moment of truth is arriving and
[4:34] you will hear a speech from the
[4:36] president thei of the United States this
[4:38] evening. President Bush will address the
[4:39] nation and the world on the situation as
[4:42] we now see it. Um in his speech, he
[4:45] clearly will issue an ultimatum to Sodom
[4:47] Hussein that the only way to avoid the
[4:50] serious consequences that were built
[4:53] into 1441 is for Sodom Hussein and his
[4:56] immediate cohort uh to leave the country
[4:59] and to allow uh this matter to be
[5:02] resolved through the peaceful entry of
[5:04] force and not of conflict. Nevertheless,
[5:07] um the president's determination will be
[5:09] made clear tonight that this matter
[5:11] cannot continue indefinitely. That Sodom
[5:13] Hussein is guilty of the charges that
[5:17] have been brought against him previously
[5:18] through these many resolutions which
[5:20] acknowledged that he had weapons of mass
[5:23] destruction and he has failed to disarm
[5:26] himself as required by the various
[5:28] resolutions. We believe and I think um
[5:31] you've also heard an opinion from uh
[5:34] British legal authorities uh within the
[5:36] last 24 hours that there is sufficient
[5:39] authority in 1441 678 and 687 earlier
[5:44] resolutions for whatever military action
[5:47] might be required. I'm very very pleased
[5:49] that the council did come together last
[5:52] November 8th for 1441. of course
[5:54] disappointed that we were unable to get
[5:56] a subsequent resolution but we believe
[5:59] that our actions now are supported by
[6:04] international law whatever actions we
[6:06] might take in the future and the
[6:07] president will talk to this issue
[6:09] tonight I won't say any more about the
[6:11] president's speech because the president
[6:12] of course will have the opportunity to
[6:14] speak for himself and uh make the points
[6:17] perfectly clear to the American people
[6:19] and to the international community.
[6:21] You'll also notice that in their
[6:24] statements yesterday at the Atlantic
[6:26] summit, all of the leaders spoke to a
[6:29] future for Iraq that will be brighter if
[6:32] it comes to the use of military force,
[6:34] where this dictator will no longer be
[6:36] able to oppress his own people, no
[6:38] longer able to threaten his neighbors,
[6:40] and no longer able to develop these
[6:42] horrible weapons which could be used
[6:45] against his neighbors as they have been
[6:47] used in the past or of greater concern
[6:49] to us. can spread and be acquired by
[6:52] terrorist organizations which might use
[6:55] them against us, our friends or our
[6:57] interest. I think it was also important
[6:59] to note in the president's statement
[7:00] yesterday his commitment to the UN and
[7:02] the role that we believe the UN will
[7:04] play uh in the aftermath of any conflict
[7:08] uh should it come and our continued
[7:10] support uh for the UN. With that, I'll
[7:12] take a couple of questions.
[7:14] >> On on the allies back in November when
[7:17] several of them tried to dilute the
[7:19] resolution and they did accomplish some
[7:21] word changes. Um would it be fair to say
[7:24] that they understood at the end that
[7:27] force was possible because they're
[7:30] impress they seem to give the impression
[7:32] they had succeeded in sidetracking
[7:35] force. And could you say if you think
[7:36] there'll be permanent damage to the
[7:39] alliance with what the French have done
[7:41] with support from Germany and Russia?
[7:43] >> On your first question, Barry, uh there
[7:45] can be no confusion on this point. If
[7:47] you remember the debate that we were
[7:49] having before 1441 was passed. There
[7:52] were some nations who insisted that a
[7:54] second resolution would be required and
[7:57] we insisted that a second resolution
[7:59] would not be required. And as we
[8:02] negotiated our way through that, we made
[8:04] it absolutely clear that we did not
[8:06] believe that the resolution as it
[8:08] finally passed would require a second
[8:10] resolution. And in fact, the resolution
[8:12] that we are not taking to a vote today
[8:15] is not a resolution that we uh believed
[8:17] was necessary. It was a resolution we
[8:20] were supporting along with the United
[8:21] Kingdom who tabled it and Spain. It was
[8:23] a resolution that would help some of our
[8:25] friends to show to their publics and to
[8:28] the world that we had taken uh one last
[8:31] step. We had made one last effort to see
[8:34] if Sodom Hussein would come into
[8:35] compliance. The burden of this problem
[8:39] rests squarely on Sodom Hussein and his
[8:43] continuing efforts to deceive, to deny,
[8:46] to do everything to divide the council,
[8:48] to take advantage of every meeting we
[8:50] have had over the last several months to
[8:52] do something just before that meeting to
[8:54] suggest that he is complying when he
[8:56] really isn't. And the world should know
[8:58] that uh this crisis is before us because
[9:00] of this regime and it flagrant violation
[9:04] of obligations that it entered into over
[9:06] the last 12 years. That's where the
[9:08] burden lies.
[9:09] >> And the is there permanent damage to the
[9:11] excuse me
[9:12] >> uh is there permanent damage to uh to
[9:14] the the alliance? I the UN uh is an
[9:18] important institution
[9:20] um and it will survive and the United
[9:23] States will continue to be uh an
[9:25] important member of the United Nations
[9:28] and its various uh uh organizations. But
[9:31] clearly this is a test in my judgment
[9:33] that the security council did not meet.
[9:35] We all knew what we were doing last
[9:37] fall. The very reason that we went into
[9:40] a went into a prolonged negotiation on
[9:43] 1441 was so that it did not become the
[9:46] same kind of resolution that we had seen
[9:49] so many times in the past that had a lot
[9:51] of words, a lot of rhetoric and Sodom
[9:53] Hussein can simply ignore and thumb his
[9:55] nose at. This was a resolution that
[9:58] every person who voted for it, every
[10:00] permanent representative who was there
[10:03] on the 8th of November and voted for
[10:04] this resolution knew that it was
[10:06] different. that serious consequences
[10:08] would flow and those serious
[10:10] consequences meant the use of force to
[10:12] disarm Sodom Hussein if he did not
[10:15] comply with that resolution and
[10:17] cooperate fully with the inspectors to
[10:19] disarm that regime.
[10:21] >> Mr. Secretary, how how long a period of
[10:23] time do you think is appropriate for
[10:24] Saddam Hussein to be uh allowed to get
[10:26] out and who uh who else besides him
[10:30] would have to leave if uh if if they
[10:33] want to avert war?
[10:34] >> Um I I won't speak to a time limit. The
[10:37] president may may do that in his speech
[10:39] this evening and I'll leave that to him.
[10:41] But clearly we would want to see Saddam
[10:44] Hussein depart as well as immediate
[10:46] members of his family who are in
[10:48] positions of control and authority over
[10:51] the armed forces of Iraq. And there are
[10:53] a number of other individuals who would
[10:54] also like to see depart. Some of them
[10:56] were mentioned in in in the weekend
[10:59] press, but it's not just one individual
[11:01] I think to solve the problem.
[11:02] >> Do you have a number though? Is there
[11:04] >> um I don't have a number at hand. There
[11:05] are variety of of numbers and ideas
[11:08] floating around and if somebody uh in
[11:10] Baghdad wishes to know the names I'm
[11:12] sure we'd be able to provide them.
[11:15] >> Mr. Secretary, can you give us some
[11:17] insight what has happened over the last
[11:18] 24 hours since the meeting in the Azors?
[11:21] Who were the problems? What kind of
[11:23] conversations did you have? Who did you
[11:25] reach out to? What were the responses?
[11:27] Um the United Kingdom obviously uh
[11:30] reached out to a number of their um
[11:34] colleagues um and um I I can't speak for
[11:37] them. I'll let them cover their own
[11:39] calls and consultations. Similarly,
[11:41] Spain and and others uh Richard will
[11:44] give you the list of my calls uh for
[11:46] this morning, but it's about uh oh 12 or
[11:49] 15. I've spoken to the French. Just
[11:51] spoke to foreign minister Dilpan. I
[11:54] spoke to foreign minister Yoshka Fischer
[11:56] of Germany. I've spoken to foreign
[11:58] minister Igor even of the Russian
[12:01] Federation. I've spoken to the new
[12:02] Chinese foreign minister, foreign
[12:04] minister Lee. Um I've spoken to
[12:07] President Masharf. I have spoken to Kofi
[12:10] Anan. Um I have spoken to uh foreign
[12:13] minister George Papandreo of Greece
[12:15] who's also in the Greek presidency for
[12:17] this period. I've spoken to foreign
[12:20] secretary straw. Uh I spoken to foreign
[12:22] minister Palasios of Spain and uh
[12:26] there's a very long list waiting when I
[12:28] get back upstairs. The response was um
[12:32] you know this this is where we are. Does
[12:34] anybody see any prospects for movement
[12:36] on this particular resolution? And uh
[12:38] frankly everybody pretty much accepted
[12:41] that this resolution was uh not going to
[12:44] be a successful one because there was
[12:47] one nation France that had indicated
[12:49] that it would veto it under any set any
[12:52] set of circumstances or any similar
[12:54] resolution is modified uh that would
[12:57] leave a path open to conflict. But we
[13:00] always knew from the very beginning that
[13:03] such a path had to be kept open. And
[13:06] this is what serious consequences meant.
[13:08] And without that path, Saddam Hussein
[13:10] would never comply. And what he was
[13:12] trying to do was just stretch it out.
[13:14] More inspections, more time. Let's
[13:16] delay. Let's let's give a little here,
[13:18] give a little there. Let's see if we can
[13:19] break this consensus. And um with the
[13:24] certainty of a uh French veto and
[13:26] possibly other vetos, uh this was not
[13:29] the time to have further division within
[13:31] the council by taking this to a vote.
[13:35] >> I've got one. Let me Excuse me. Excuse
[13:36] me. Yeah,
[13:37] >> Mr. Secretary, you seem to imply
[13:38] yesterday on one of the shows that you
[13:40] believe French commercial interests
[13:41] would help drive the position. I'm
[13:42] wondering if you can elaborate on that.
[13:44] And how firm a guarantee do we have that
[13:45] Turkey won't send its troops well into
[13:47] northern Iraq and cause problems with
[13:49] the the Kurds there? I I made the point
[13:52] that there in response to the question
[13:54] that of course they're their commercial
[13:55] interest uh that everybody has to uh
[13:58] consider. Um and the French have uh for
[14:03] years had difficulties with the
[14:06] inspection regime. And I pointed out in
[14:07] one of the shows yesterday that when you
[14:10] go back to 19 98 in 19 early 1999 when
[14:15] the current inspection regime was being
[14:18] developed when UNMOIC was being created
[14:20] after the collapse of the previous
[14:22] inspection regime uh France worked
[14:25] actively for a number of months and our
[14:27] judgment to uh try to weaken that
[14:30] inspection regime. uh and at the end of
[14:33] the day when compromises had been made
[14:35] and everybody thought we had a a good
[14:37] outcome before our time previous
[14:40] administration even then France
[14:42] abstained from voting for it and so uh
[14:45] um that is of concern to us but in 1441
[14:50] France was solidly on board and when you
[14:53] look at the statements that were made by
[14:54] French officials right after the passage
[14:57] of 1441 it was absolutely clear that
[15:00] they understood that Saddam Hussein and
[15:03] the Iraqi regime had weapons of mass
[15:05] destruction. It's not something just
[15:07] known to American intelligence. It's
[15:09] known to all of the major intelligence
[15:10] agencies uh in the world. And France
[15:13] acknowledged that. Everybody
[15:14] acknowledged that when they signed on to
[15:15] 1441 because that's what it says. It's
[15:17] in Iraq is in material breach, has been
[15:20] in material breach and now has the
[15:22] opportunity to either get out of the
[15:23] problem or get into further material
[15:25] breach. And what they did was get into
[15:26] further material breach. And that's our
[15:28] judgment. And we believe that the test
[15:31] of the resolution has been met with
[15:32] respect to uh uh the appropriateness of
[15:35] application of serious consequences
[15:37] >> and the Turks and the Kurds.
[15:38] >> Barbara, I'm I'm sorry on on the Turks
[15:42] and the situation in northern Iraq. We
[15:44] are in the closest consultation with the
[15:46] Turks and uh uh let me say that we are
[15:49] very sensitive to Turkish concerns. Uh
[15:52] we appreciate the fact that uh the
[15:55] Turkish government did take our request
[15:57] for uh deployments into their parliament
[16:02] uh at a difficult time for them with a
[16:03] prime minister who was still uh coming
[16:06] in so to speak. Mr. Erdogan was not the
[16:09] prime minister at that time and we are
[16:11] in the closest touch with them now on on
[16:13] a number of issues. one uh the
[16:16] possibility of resubmission and he he is
[16:18] committed to do that at a time that he
[16:20] believes is appropriate and secondly we
[16:22] don't think it would be useful right now
[16:24] to create any additional tension on the
[16:26] border between uh Turkey and northern
[16:29] Iraq and we are in discussions with them
[16:31] as to how to uh make sure that tensions
[16:35] can be kept at the lowest point and not
[16:38] to have difficulty in northern Iraq of
[16:40] the kind that concerns them. And we have
[16:42] also uh assured the Turks that in
[16:45] anything that the future might hold, we
[16:48] are committed to the territorial
[16:50] integrity of Iraq.
[16:53] >> I wanted to ask I wanted to ask uh just
[16:55] some personal reflections. Uh after 1441
[16:58] was passed, you were very very happy man
[17:00] and uh uh certainly it was quite a
[17:03] triumph. Um how have you been feeling
[17:05] the last few weeks? When did you realize
[17:07] that this was not going to happen? Do
[17:09] you wish you'd done anything
[17:10] differently? Do you wish you'd traveled
[17:12] more, changed your tactics in any way?
[17:14] >> This this uh this legend that is out
[17:17] there now that Colon Pal one he the
[17:20] first v variation of it was he doesn't
[17:22] travel and the next variation was he he
[17:25] hates to travel and the third variation
[17:26] was uh he will never travel and doesn't
[17:29] want to travel. um you you do your job
[17:33] by personal contact, by contact, by
[17:37] travel and by the use of modern
[17:39] technology so that uh you can get more
[17:42] bang for the time. And so, um, in the
[17:46] last 6 weeks, I have had, uh, four
[17:50] personal one-on-one meetings, direct
[17:52] meetings with the French foreign
[17:54] minister, with the British foreign
[17:57] minister,
[17:59] uh, with the Russian foreign minister,
[18:01] five such meetings with the Chinese
[18:04] foreign minister. I have gone to Davos
[18:07] in Switzerland where I addressed an
[18:08] international
[18:10] uh setting and at that meeting I met
[18:12] with the Turkish prime minister for
[18:15] almost two hours and the incoming
[18:17] Turkish prime minister Mr. Erdogan. I've
[18:20] had the Turkish a Turkish delegation
[18:22] here in the department, a full
[18:24] delegation, the foreign minister, the uh
[18:27] finance minister and they came to my
[18:28] home till midnight as we worked on the
[18:30] economic package and so I uh believe
[18:34] that I have used my time properly. Uh at
[18:36] the same time I went to Asia a few weeks
[18:38] ago. So I travel when I believe travel
[18:41] is appropriate. I'd like to travel more
[18:44] but you know the secretary of state has
[18:45] many responsibilities that he or she has
[18:48] to has to deal with and one has to
[18:50] balance it all but I assure you that I
[18:53] do not uh shrink back from traveling and
[18:56] I will be traveling again soon.
[18:57] >> But any regrets anything you would have
[18:59] done differently? Oh, I mean what you
[19:03] can always look and say should have done
[19:05] this, should have done that, but the
[19:06] fact of the matter is we came up with a
[19:08] good resolution and we got a solid vote
[19:11] for it 15 to zero and then for a period
[19:15] of 4 months after that we worked hard
[19:18] with the inspectors. We provided them
[19:19] intelligence. The focus really was at
[19:22] the UN in New York, not you know a lot
[19:24] of other places. That's where we had to
[19:26] concentrate our effort. And we did
[19:28] everything we could to try to persuade
[19:32] the council that what they were seeing
[19:33] was not compliance. What they were
[19:36] seeing was passive cooperation that
[19:38] didn't get to the heart of the matter,
[19:39] which was a strategic decision by Sodom
[19:42] Hussein to comply.
[19:44] And that's what we weren't able to get.
[19:46] And that's what uh we weren't able to
[19:48] convince some members of the council uh
[19:51] is what was needed uh in order for us to
[19:54] believe uh that Sodom Hussein was a
[19:58] changed regime was leading a changed
[20:01] regime uh that was willing now to
[20:04] cooperate with the international
[20:05] community and comply with its
[20:06] obligations. One last one.
[20:09] >> Mr. Secretary, you said that the
[20:10] ultimatum would be for Saddam Hussein to
[20:12] leave Iraq. Is there any form of
[20:14] disarmament or cooperation at this stage
[20:17] which could uh save his skin?
[20:19] >> I think the the time for diplomacy uh
[20:22] has passed. Um I think that's pretty
[20:25] clear. Uh that's what the leaders were
[20:28] saying in the Azors yesterday. Um and um
[20:33] we uh used last evening and uh this
[20:37] morning to consult broadly around the
[20:39] world. We did, the British did, the
[20:42] Spanish did. Um, a lot of people have
[20:44] been talking to each other this morning
[20:46] and over the overnight and it became
[20:48] clear that uh uh it would be best at
[20:51] this time to withdraw the resolution and
[20:53] I can think of nothing uh that Saddam
[20:55] Hussein could do diplomatically. I think
[20:57] that that time is now over. He had his
[21:00] chance. He's had many chances over the
[21:02] last 12 years and he has blown every one
[21:05] of those chances. Thank you.
[21:06] >> Thank you. Secretary of State Coen
[21:08] Powell speaking at the State Department
[21:10] this morning and the headline there is
[21:12] clearly the time for diplomacy has
[21:13] passed and that tonight when the
[21:14] president speaks to the nation at 8:00
[21:16] Eastern time which we will of course
[21:18] carry live he will give Saddam Hussein
[21:21] an ultimatum leave the country with your
[21:24] immediate entourage or the war begins
[21:27] takes us straight to the White House.
[21:28] ABC's John Cochran is there. John, I
[21:30] gather there's been something of a
[21:32] debate this morning about whether there
[21:33] should be a deadline for Saddam Hussein.
[21:35] There is a division of opinion. You
[21:36] know, for weeks, Peter, we've been told
[21:38] that from the final stages of this
[21:39] crisis was reached, President Bush would
[21:41] tell Saddam Hussein, "Okay, you've got
[21:43] from 1 to 5 days to get out of town, to
[21:45] get out of Iraq." I'm now being told by
[21:47] an official here that some people within
[21:49] the White House say that would be a
[21:50] mistake. The official said, "Look, if we
[21:53] tell him you've got to be out of Iraq in
[21:55] 72 hours, that tips him off. We're going
[21:57] to attack in the 73rd hour. That would
[22:00] better enable him to prepare his
[22:01] defenses." It may be better to be vague
[22:03] to simply say Saddam Hussein must leave
[22:05] immediately. Others in the White House
[22:07] think you must give Saddam Hussein a
[22:09] time certain. The president will have to
[22:10] make that call before 8:00 p.m. Eastern
[22:12] time tonight.
[22:13] >> Many thanks, John. John Cochran at the
[22:15] White House on the president's speech
[22:16] tonight. Let's go back to the State
[22:17] Department. ABC's Martha Radits is
[22:19] there. Um Martha, the secretary was very
[22:22] careful to say that they felt they had
[22:23] an authorization force for force that
[22:26] would stand up under international law
[22:28] and they're blaming the French. But did
[22:30] they have the votes on the Security
[22:31] Council from all the other people?
[22:33] >> Very good point. I caught that as well.
[22:34] He kept talking about the permanent
[22:36] members, but the 10 non-permanent
[22:39] members were not there for the United
[22:41] States. I spoke to a senior State
[22:42] Department official just before
[22:44] Secretary Pal went on the air. He said,
[22:46] "We were really close, but we weren't
[22:48] quite there with the vote." But
[22:50] naturally, what Secretary Powell wants
[22:52] to do is blame the French in this. Say
[22:54] they would have vetoed it. He doesn't
[22:55] want to put any more pressure on these
[22:57] countries they were trying to bring
[22:58] along in hopes of eventually bringing
[23:00] them on.
[23:01] >> Okay, Martha, thanks very much. You
[23:02] remind the audience just in I'm sure it
[23:04] already knows that France, Germany,
[23:05] Russia and all the other many many other
[23:07] countries overseas have huge huge
[23:09] majorities of public opinion which are
[23:11] opposed to this war and therefore
[23:12] support their uh government taking a
[23:15] position against using force.
[23:17] Interesting the number of phone calls
[23:18] that Secretary of State has made just in
[23:20] the last while. France, Germany, Russia,
[23:22] China, Pakistan. uh the secretary
[23:25] general of the United Nations, Greece,
[23:26] Britain, Spain and a long list waiting
[23:28] for him now to explain the US position
[23:29] and what is going to happen next. One of
[23:32] the things that is happening at the
[23:33] moment is that there is extraordinary
[23:34] tension in Baghdad and members of the
[23:37] non-governmental organizations, the
[23:39] press and the UN weapons inspectors are
[23:41] beginning to move out of that country
[23:43] because ABC's Dan Harris is on the
[23:45] border with Jordan and Iraq on the
[23:48] telephone because the president
[23:49] spokesman said today, Dan, it's a very
[23:52] unsafe place to be. Can you fill us in
[23:54] on the mood?
[23:55] >> A lot of people have reached that
[23:57] conclusion, Peter. You just crossed over
[23:58] the border into Jordan after making the
[24:00] the drive from Baghdad. We saw some
[24:02] military preparations on the road
[24:04] outside of town. I have to tell you
[24:05] though was not overwhelming amount of
[24:07] activity. Where you're really seeing the
[24:09] change is the increase in tension as you
[24:10] mentioned in Baghdad itself. Longer
[24:12] lines, very long lines at gas stations
[24:14] as people get ready to stock up. And one
[24:17] very telling sign is the change at the
[24:19] Ministry of Information where we as
[24:21] journalists do much of our work. The
[24:22] people who are now minding the
[24:24] journalists have gone from bureaucrats
[24:27] to, we're told, members of the secret
[24:29] police who report directly to Saddam
[24:31] Hussein's son, Kusay.
[24:34] Thank you, Dan. Dan Harris on the Iraqi
[24:36] Jordan border. There are other signs
[24:37] that people are beginning to leave what
[24:39] one of the wire services described as
[24:40] fairly well healed, better off uh Iraqis
[24:43] now making their way to Syria, just to
[24:45] the northwest of Baghdad. um getting out
[24:48] of the way while the possibility of war
[24:50] is so imminent. Which takes us, of
[24:52] course, finally to the Pentagon and
[24:54] ABC's John Mcwithy. John, what do you
[24:56] think happens next?
[24:57] >> I think there are going to be some
[24:59] things that we will not necessarily see.
[25:02] Peter, uh undoubtedly the US is very
[25:05] carefully watching any preemptive
[25:07] potential that Saddam Hussein may have.
[25:10] This could include artillery on the
[25:13] Kuwaiti border where so many American
[25:15] troops are. artillery that might have
[25:17] weapons of mass destruction uh as part
[25:20] of the uh the load. Uh so they are
[25:22] watching that carefully. It would not
[25:24] surprise me if some of those units were
[25:26] taken out in the next 12 hours anyway.
[25:29] They're also watching the western desert
[25:31] extremely closely uh for any potential
[25:34] of Scud missiles that might be fired at
[25:37] Israel for example to try to bring that
[25:39] country into a conflict. If you can in a
[25:41] phrase or so, John, you say watching. Do
[25:43] you mean actually that the US is now
[25:45] attacking Iraqi assets in these various
[25:47] parts that you refer to?
[25:48] >> They are not attacking them uh at this
[25:51] moment as best I can tell, Peter. But I
[25:53] think uh the probability that some of
[25:55] these things are going to be struck in
[25:57] the next uh half a day are is quite
[26:00] high.
[26:00] >> Okay, thanks very much John McQuey at
[26:02] the Pentagon. That's about the way it is
[26:03] for the moment. will be on the air
[26:05] anytime anything uh virtually anything
[26:08] happens as we run up to what is now very
[26:10] likely to be war in the next couple of
[26:12] days, maybe the next several days. We'll
[26:14] only know that tonight when we hear the
[26:15] president say what he intends to say to
[26:17] Saddam Hussein himself. 8:00 p.m.
[26:19] Eastern time. We shall cover that live.
[26:21] We're now going to return you to regular
[26:23] programming which in on the West Coast
[26:25] is of course Good Morning America. I'm
[26:26] Peter Jennings.
[26:30] For continuing coverage of this story,
[26:32] stay with ABC News and abcnews.com.
[26:36] This has been a special report from ABC
[26:38] News.
[26:44] We'll join the view after these
[26:45] messages.